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Abstract
EU trade and investment policy is in flux. The rate at which the global trade and investment
architecture is evolving through the mega-regional Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”) is unprece-
dented. In this context, we explain how European lawyers and trade negotiators are addressing the
newly acquired investment competence, while at the same time reforming investment arbitration
and proposing new systems of dispute resolution at the international level. EU trade negotiators
have put forward transformative proposals for investment chapters in their FTAs to safeguard,
above all, the autonomy of the EU legal order in its relationship with international arbitration law.
By mapping the clash between the investor-State adjudication regime and the EU legal order, we
identify the possible legal tools needed to overcome them. Moreover, while supporting the new
EU judicial architecture and its procedural rules through an Investment Court System (“ICS”),
rather than traditional Investor-State Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”) clauses, we propose greater en-
gagement with State-to-State arbitration and further substantive reforms for a truly transformative
adjudication system addressing global inequalities created by the current investment regime.
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ABSTRACT 
EU trade and investment policy is in flux. The rate at which the 
global trade and investment architecture is evolving through the 
mega-regional Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”) is unprecedented. In 
this context, we explain how European lawyers and trade negotiators 
are addressing the newly acquired investment competence, while at 
the same time reforming investment arbitration and proposing new 
systems of dispute resolution at the international level. EU trade 
negotiators have put forward transformative proposals for investment 
chapters in their FTAs to safeguard, above all, the autonomy of the 
EU legal order in its relationship with international arbitration law. 
By mapping the clash between the investor-State adjudication regime 
and the EU legal order, we identify the possible legal tools needed to 
overcome them. Moreover, while supporting the new EU judicial 
architecture and its procedural rules through an Investment Court 
System (“ICS”), rather than traditional Investor-State Dispute 
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Settlement (“ISDS”) clauses, we propose greater engagement with 
State-to-State arbitration and further substantive reforms for a truly 
transformative adjudication system addressing global inequalities 
created by the current investment regime. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In delimiting the EU’s new competence in the field of direct 
investments under Article 207(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (“TFEU”), this provision, read together with 
Article 3(1)(e) TFEU, has left some important gaps in demarcating 
the scope of investment protection rules as part of the EU’s common 
commercial policy. While the EU has acquired a new power and is 
finally “catching up” with the regime of bilateral investment treaties 
(“BITs”), the Commission is negotiating and concluding new mega-
regional Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”), such as the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”), the EU-Singapore and 
EU-Vietnam bilateral agreements and the newly released 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada 
(“CETA 2016”).3 Because of the political relevance of TTIP and the 
public consultation launched by the Commission on Investor State 
                                                                                                                                     
3. Pending the publishing of this article, the European Commission and the Canadian 
government have agreed to include a new approach on investment protection and investment 
dispute settlement in the CETA, which almost entirely implements the one put forward by the 
Commission in its Proposal of 21 November 2015 for Investment Protection and Resolution of 
Investment Disputes Proposal in the TTIP. See Chapter II, Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, E.U.-U.S. (unratified as of Aug. 2016), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf [hereinafter 2015 TTIP Proposal]. Following 
the legal revision of the text by the Commission, the CETA was made public on February 29, 
2016. See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, E.U.-Can. (unratified as of Aug. 
2016), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/index_it.htm [hereinafter 
CETA].  A few weeks before, on February 1st, the text of the FTA with Vietnam, as it had 
been negotiated by the Parties – which content may change following the legal revision by the 
Commission – was finalized. See EU-Vietnam Trade Agreement, E.U.-Viet. (unratified as of 
Aug. 2016), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/
vietnam/ [hereinafter EU-Viet. FTA]. This agreement, like the CETA, has been shaped on the 
2015 TTIP Proposal. The authors took this evolution into account, as far as possible, which 
touches upon several issues at the core of this article, including: the establishment of a 
permanent investment tribunal and of an appeal system; the future institution of a permanent 
multilateral investment court; and the exclusion of EU law from the jurisdiction of the 
tribunals. 
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Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”) on March 27 2014 – which results have 
been published on January 13 20154 – the regime of investment 
arbitration has sparked public interest questions of judicial 
accountability, transparency and democracy. 
As Sophie Meunier has shown, the long-awaited transfer of 
competence over investment law, brought by the Lisbon Treaty, from 
the Member States to the EU – which enables the Union to negotiate 
on their behalf in FTAs containing investment chapters –, has 
happened by “stealth,” meaning that the tense political debate prior to 
the shift of competence left open important questions on 
implementation.5 For example, the German Constitutional Court 
expressed caution on including such a broad investment protection in 
competence, arguing instead that it should be confined to investment 
as a controlling power over an enterprise.6 The EU has not yet 
overcome the resistance of its Member States committed to 
maintaining their BITs and to the protection of property according to 
their different constitutional traditions.7 
Moreover, it remains to be seen what the CJEU will state in its 
Opinion 2/15 on the FTA with Singapore, as it was requested by the 
Commission, in accordance with Article 218(11) TFEU, to rule on the 
delimitation of competences between the EU and Member States in 
the field of external investment law. In particular, the Commission 
asked the Court whether the Union has the requisite competence to 
                                                                                                                                     
4. COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT, REPORT, ONLINE PUBLIC CONSULTATION 
ON INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND INVESTOR-TO-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS) IN THE 
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (Jan. 13, 2015), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153044.pdf [hereinafter TTIP 
Consultation]. 
5. See Sophie Meunier, Integration By Stealth: How The European Union Gained 
Competence Over Foreign Direct Investment (Dec. 23, 2013) (paper for the 7th Annual 
Conference of the Political Economy of International Organizations, January 16-18, 2014, 
Princeton University), http://www.uni-heidelberg.de/md/awi/peio/meunier_05.09.2013.pdf, at 
2. 
6. See Meunier, supra note 5, at 12. See August Reinisch, The EU on the Investment 
Path, (unpublished draft paper), available at http://law.scu.edu/wp-content/uploads/investment/
Reinisch-EU-Investment-Law-Quo-Vadis-26-01-2013.pdf at n.7 (citing the German 
Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08, 30 June 2009, ¶ 379). 
7. See Presentation by Joakim Reiter, Deputy Secretary General UNCTAD at the XXIV 
Meeting of the Trade Policy Experts Group (Mar. 15, 2016) (explaining that the difference 
between Sweden and Germany vis-a-vis to BITs lies also in the different protection of property 
that can be found in the Swedish constitution but not in the German one) (notes from the 
presentation on file with author). 
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sign and conclude the agreement without the involvement of the 
Member States.8 
The political tensions and ambiguities left in the Treaty of 
Lisbon over the external EU investment competence have created 
new challenges but also opened new avenues to reform international 
investment regimes and their dispute mechanism. Initially, to avoid 
the clashes between intra-EU BITs, the Commission launched a series 
of infringement proceedings against Sweden, Austria, and Finland, 
obliging the Member States to eliminate incompatibilities between 
their international and EU law obligations in favor of the latter.9 
Throughout the TTIP negotiations that began in 2013, and the most 
recent CETA 2016 and the EU-Vietnam FTA, the EU has 
demonstrated great transformative potential in setting aside old ISDS 
clauses enforced by private arbitrators while establishing permanent 
tribunals of first instance and appeal and aiming to consolidate a 
multilateral investment Court system. 
This transformative process began when the Commission 
realized that, at least in the EU, the inclusion of ISDS clauses 
remained one of the main “nails in the coffin” the TTIP negotiations 
brought up, not only in international legal circles but also amongst the 
EU and its Member States, across academia, and in civil society. Of 
particular importance in the EU context are the aforementioned 
results of the Commission’s public consultation launched on March 
2014, followed by the Commission’s Concept Paper published in May 
2015,10 the European Parliament’s resolution of July 8, 201511 and the 
                                                                                                                                     
8. More specifically the Commission asked the CJEU the following questions: which 
provisions of the agreement fall within the Union’s exclusive competence?; Which provisions 
of the agreement fall within the Union’s shared competence?; Is there any provision of the 
agreement that falls within the exclusive competence of the Member States? See Request for 
an Opinion Submitted by the European Commission Pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, 
(Opinion 2/5), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=
&docid=170868&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2249
38. 
9. See Nikos Lavranos, Member States’ Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs): Lost in 
Transition?, in HAGUE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 281-82 (Nikos Lavranos et al. 
eds., 2011). 
10. See Commission Concept Paper: Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path to reform 
(May 15, 2015) available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_
153408.PDF last visited August 10, 2016 (hereinafter Commission Concept Paper). 
11. The European Parliament, in its Resolution of July 8, 2015, has not rejected the 
inclusion ex se of the ISDS clause in the TTIP. See Julie Levy-Abegnoli, TTIP: EU 
Commission Unveils Replacement for Controversial ISDS, PARLIAMENT MAGAZINE (Sept. 16, 
2015), https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/news/ttip-eu-commission-unveils-
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Commission’s 2015 TTIP Proposal.12 ISDS clauses were indeed an 
incredibly controversial topic in the media and feared by civil society 
in Europe, causing the Commission a huge setback in negotiations. 
After a large stakeholder consultation encountered over 150,000 
responses, the Commission elaborated a preliminary response 
attempting to highlight the two major sites of the controversies around 
investor-State arbitration and the right to regulate.13 While the 
negotiators have argued that these responses would be used sparingly, 
an UNCTAD report has shown that ISDS clauses do not necessarily 
positively impact investment flows14 and lawyers have argued over 
the limits of domestic courts and long awaited an international 
investment court.15 Many host governments see these clauses as an 
obstacle to environmental and social policies that will be challenged 
in front of arbitrators rather than courts. On the other hand, investors 
favor ISDS clauses for fear that host governments will adopt 
legislation in conflict with investment or trade treaty obligations. 
The position of the Commission resulted in a compromise 
between these two polar positions in its Report on the consultation on 
ISDS in TTIP. Here the Commission began signaling its initial 
criticism to the traditional ISDS model. For instance, the Commission 
explained how for small and medium-size enterprises the costs of 
ISDS mechanisms remain too high, especially with the application of 
the “loser pay” principle.16 Commissioner Malmström has explained 
that there are already some 1,400 EU agreements (another 3,000 
globally) in existence since the 1950s and that BITs are overall a 
German invention.17 However, in response to the criticisms on ISDS, 
in December 2015 David O’Sullivan, EU Ambassador to the United 
States, addressed the ISDS challenge: “TTIP will allow us to improve 
                                                                                                                                     
replacement-controversial-isds?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily+Parliament+
Magazine+Round-Up&utm_content=Daily+Parliament+Magazine+Round-Up+CID_
7aaab1fa16cc22afa94c82df5cfb75e5&utm_source=Email+newsletters&utm_term=TTIP+EU+
Commission+unveils+replacement+for+controversial+ISDS. 
12. See Chapter II, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, supra note 3. 
13. See TTIP Consultation, supra note 4, at 3. 
14. See TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2014, UNCTAD (2014), http://unctad.org/
en/PublicationsLibrary/tdr2014_en.pdf. 
15. See GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 180 
(2007). 
16. See TTIP Consultation, supra note 4, at 16, 22 (discussing various business NGOs 
opposed to the principle). 
17. Cecilia Malmström, EU Trade Comm’r, Eur. Comm’n, Speech at the Open Europe & 
Friedrich Naumann Stiftung: Debating TTIP, (Dec. 11, 2014). 
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them. We must acknowledge both their weaknesses (cases against 
tobacco plain packaging legislation being an example of ‘ISDS gone 
wrong’) and their benefits (preventing expropriation, for example, 
with its consequent job losses).”18 The changing attitude of the 
Commission towards the traditional ISDS model was fueled by 
Phillip Morris’ challenge against Australian packaging regulations, 
and the subsequent tobacco carve-out in order to avoid potential 
investors’ claims of action in this sector for the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPP) between the US and 11 other Asia-
Pacific nations. 
In 2015, however, the Commission went further than just 
introducing carve-out clauses with the TTIP’s transformative 
investment proposal, moving away from the traditional ISDS model 
of private arbitrators to create instead an Investment Court System, 
constituted (“ICS”) by permanent tribunals. This was in response to 
the criticisms expressed by the European Parliament, civil society, 
some Member States and their national parliaments alike distrusting 
the current international arbitration regimes for lack of democratic 
accountability, consistency, openness and independence. Throughout 
its TTIP negotiation position, the Commission progressively sought to 
address both procedural and substantive criticism: starting from the 
fact that international arbitrators ought to be more independent and 
the system more open, it launched the proposal of permanent tribunals 
with nominated permanent judges bound to ethical rules to prevent 
conflicts of interest. In response to the lack of consistency and the 
broad discretion of arbitrators in the application of general principles 
(such as the right to regulate and the fair and equitable treatment 
(“FET”) standard) the Commission drafted comprehensive tests 
departing from notions of equity in customary international law 
(“CIL”). 
The establishment of permanent investment tribunals, of first 
and second instance, is a prominent innovation of the latest reiteration 
of the FTA with Vietnam as well as of the CETA 2016, which both 
further engage in the creation of a multilateral court system replacing 
                                                                                                                                     
18. Letter by David O’Sullivan, Ambassador of the European Union to the United States, 
Responding to TTIP Criticisms (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.euintheus.org/press-media/letter-
by-david-osullivan-responding-to-ttip-criticisms/. 
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the investment tribunals.19 As to the CETA 2016, a permanent 
Tribunal, with fifteen appointed members in equal numbers by the 
EU, Canada, and third parties for terms of five years, will also have 
high ethical standards about their independence and possible conflicts 
of interest.20 In following the approach of TTIP, CETA 2016 ensures 
consistency in adjudication with the creation of a permanent 
“Appellate Tribunal” that will uphold, modify or reverse the 
Tribunal’s awards and will be constituted by a decision of the CETA 
Joint Committee.21 The EU-Vietnam FTA establishes as well a 
Tribunal of first instance of nine members22 and an “Appeal 
Tribunal,” constituted by six judges once again appointed in equal 
number by the EU, Vietnam and third countries.23 While CETA 
leaves it to the Joint Committee to decide the procedures of the 
Appellate Tribunal, the EU-Vietnam FTA, like the TTIP 2015 
Proposal, specifies judges’ salaries, appellate procedures and goes as 
far as stating that the Appeal Tribunal should decide by consensus or 
anonymous majority voting.24 However, the long-term goal of both 
CETA 2016 and EU-Vietnam Tribunals is to transform this bilateral 
system into a multilateral one that could eventually also incorporate 
the TTIP tribunals.25 
This transformative proposal has met lots of resistance, 
especially amongst US trade circles, in which lawyers have warned 
against overstating the benefits of a permanent system of investment 
disputes between States and investors, the unintended consequences 
of a more “consistent” investment regime with less flexibility, and the 
costly procedures coinciding with greater accountability in decision-
                                                                                                                                     
19. See Commission Press Release, CETA: EU and Canada Agree on New Approach on 
Investment in Trade Agreement, IP/16/399 (Feb. 29, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-399_en.htm. 
20. See CETA, supra note 3, arts. 8.27 and 8.30. 
21. CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.28. For an explanation, see Press Release, CETA: EU and 
Canada Agree on New Approach on Investment in Trade Agreement (Feb. 29, 2016), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-399_en.htm. 
22. See EU-Viet. Free Trade Agreement, Ch. II of Ch. 8, Sect. 3, supra note 3, art. 12, ¶ 
2; 2015 TTIP Proposal, supra note 3, Ch. II, art. 9. 
23. See EU-Viet. Free Trade Agreement, Ch. II of Ch. 8, Sect. 3, supra note 3, art. 13, ¶ 
2; 2015 TTIP Proposal, supra note 3, Ch. II, art. 10. 
24. See EU-Viet. Free Trade Agreement, Ch. II. of Ch. 8, Sect. 3, supra note 3, art. 13, ¶ 
12. 
25. See CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.29; EU-Viet. Free Trade Agreement, Ch. II of Ch. 8, 
Sect. 3, supra note 3, art. 15. 
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making.26 When compared to the US and the recent TPP agreement, 
the EU appears in CETA 2016 and the EU-Vietnam FTA as an 
equally influential global actor, yet more committed to transformative 
reforms and greater engagement and responsiveness to its civil 
society.27 
However, we argue that the transformative EU proposal stems, 
above all, from internal constraints such as the need to safeguard the 
EU legal order and to avoid jurisdictional clashes, as well as the need 
to reconcile the opposing notions of the right to regulate for public 
interest, and the fair and equitable treatment of foreign investments.28 
In Section I, we show the rationale for why the EU should remain 
committed to the inclusion of investor-State adjudication in its FTAs, 
such as the new ICS – in contrast with old fashioned ISDS clauses. 
This includes the risk of politicization arising from systems of dispute 
resolution governed only by diplomatic protection and State-to-State 
arbitration, as well as from the lack of direct effect of international 
trade agreements. Section II shows that the Commission has 
introduced important provisions in its EU-Vietnam FTA and CETA 
2016, which aim at preserving the right to regulate for public policies 
and create a clear and objective test to interpret the FET standard 
beyond the vague equity principles derived from CIL. Regarding 
extra-EU agreements, we identify the main challenges for the EU in 
concluding those agreements while simultaneously respecting the 
principle of autonomy of the EU legal order above all in order to 
safeguard the interpretive monopoly of the CJEU. In Section III, we 
seek to focus on the relation between State-to-State arbitration and 
investor-State adjudication in order to envisage an effective system of 
coordination between these two mechanisms. As far as investor-State 
arbitration is concerned, our reasoning counts for FTAs, such as 
Singapore, which does not (at least so far) include an ICS, as well as 
for other agreements, such as the TTIP, should the ICS not be 
included in the final text (due to the Third Country partner’s 
opposition or, less likely, to a changeover on the part of EU 
institutions). As it will be shown, most of the analysis may apply also 
                                                                                                                                     
26. See Caroline Simson, TTIP’s Investment Court System Likely to be Problematic, 
LAW360, (Feb. 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/763889/ttip-s-investment-court-
system-likely-to-be-problematic. 
27. See Fernanda G. Nicola, The Politicization of Legal Expertise in the TTIP 
Negotiation, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175 (2015). 
28. See George A. Bermann, Navigating EU Law and the Law of International 
Arbitration, 28 ARB. INT’L 397, 443-44 (2012). 
1090 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1081 
to agreements containing ICS provisions. Finally, we address the 
transformative potential of the permanent investment tribunals in 
CETA 2016 and the EU-Vietnam FTA from both a procedural and 
substantive perspective. The ICS demonstrates that the Commission 
has challenged the status quo of the traditional ISDS regime to 
institutionalize a permanent tribunal. From a procedural perspective 
we welcome this new investment regime embodying the main criteria 
of public law adjudication. Yet we question whether in substance the 
ICS is equipped with necessary tools to engage with global 
inequalities, sustainable devolvement and human rights violations 
arising in the current international investment regime in a 
transformative way.29 
I. THE RATIONALE FOR KEEPING INVESTOR-STATE 
ADJUDICATION IN EU FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
A. Risks of Politicization Arising from State-to-State Arbitration and 
National Jurisdictions 
The rationale for the inclusion of investor-State arbitration in the 
form of ISDS30 in the free trade and investment agreements under 
negotiation or conclusion by the EU31 lies in the need to ensure 
impartiality and the de-politicization of disputes.32 The same holds 
                                                                                                                                     
29. See UNCTAD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015, UNCTAD xi-xii (2015), http://unctad.org
/en/PublicationChapters/wir2015ch0_KeyMessage_en.pdf (committing to sustainable 
development and corporate social responsibility as a tradeoff to property protection). 
30. See generally UNCTAD WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015, UNCTAD (2015), 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf; ICSID 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, 
ICSID (2015), https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/ICSID_
AR15_ENG_CRA-highres.pdf (providing data and statistics on the proliferation of investment 
dispute settlement systems). See, e.g., ANDREAS LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW 554-57 (2008); August Reinisch, The Proliferation of International Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms, The Threat of Fragmentation vs. the Promise of a More Effective System? Some 
Reflections From the Perspective of Investment Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND FRAGMENTATION: FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF GERHARD 
HAFNER 107-25 (Isabelle Buffard, James Crawford, Alain Pellet, & Stephan Wittich, eds., 
2008) (identifying some of the main features of current investment dispute settlement 
systems). 
31. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
arts. 216-19, 2012 O.J. C 326/47, at 144-47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
32. See Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States, in SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND 
OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 194-96, 188-239 (1995) 
(stressing that ICSID itself was conceived as a means of de-politicization). See also Ibrahim 
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true, mutatis mutandis, for other systems of investor-State 
adjudication, such as the ICS included in the 2015 TTIP Proposal, the 
EU-Vietnam FTA and the CETA 2016. Indeed, if no provision is 
made for this type of dispute-settlement mechanism,33 the only 
avenues available to foreign investors wishing to sue the EU and/or 
its Member States (and directly enforce their rights), as well as to 
European investors wishing to sue the host partner State, will be 
State-to-State arbitration34 and domestic judicial proceedings.35 
“Domestic” means, as far as the EU is concerned, procedures both 
before Member States’ national courts and the CJEU.36 In this respect, 
it is too soon to assess with certainty what the new evolution on the 
institution of an ICS, currently applied to two EU trade partners 
(Canada and Vietnam, one developed country, one developing 
country) may represent for agreements still under negotiation or 
conclusion. Definitely, if confirmed in the future, it will represent a 
radical twist that may be effective for the whole EU trade and 
                                                                                                                                     
F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Role of ICSID 
and MIGA, 1 ICSID R.––FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1 (1986); Sergio Puig, Emergence and Dynamism 
in International Organizations: ICSID, Investor-State Arbitration and International 
Investment Law, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 531 (2013). See Catharine Titi, Are Investment Tribunals 
Adjudicating Political Disputes? Some Reflections on the Repoliticization of Investment 
Disputes and (New) Forms of Diplomatic Protection, 32 J. INT’L ARB. 261, 262-67 (2015) 
(giving an historical overview on the Convention, from the standpoint of de-politicization of 
disputes). See generally Kaj Hober, Does Investment Arbitration Have a Future?, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A HANDBOOK 1873-79 (Marc Bungenberg, Jörn Griebel, 
Stephan Hobe, & August Reinisch eds., 2015) (writing on the future of investor-state 
arbitration). On the limits of de-politicization see Martins Paparinskis, The Limits of De-
politicization in Contemporary Investor-State Arbitration, in SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 271-84 (James Crawford & Sarah Nouwen 
eds., 2010). 
33. Moreover, while it is true that the rationale for investor-State arbitration lies in the 
de-politicization of disputes, it is also true that all remedies have some contraindications; for 
example, the danger of politicization may arise regardless of the system of conflict resolution 
concerned, including investor-State arbitration. 
34. See Free-trade agreements: A Better Way to Arbitrate, ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21623674-protections-foreign-investors-are-not-
horror-critics-claim-they-could-be-improved 
(writing as one of the most influential supporters of State-to-State remedies in the context 
of investment agreements). 
35. See generally EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DRAFT REPORT CONTAINING THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSION ON THE NEGOTIATIONS 
FOR THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (TTIP) (2014) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-
549.135+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN (reporting in favor of this twofold solution (State-to-State 
arbitration and domestic remedies)). 
36. On this point see infra Section I.A.2. 
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investment policy, including the TTIP. The following analysis had 
been conceived, on the basis of the most relevant literature on 
investment arbitration, and then carried out, in its core elements, 
before the finalization of both the CETA 2016 and the EU-Vietnam 
FTA; yet most of it, although being devoted originally to ISDS 
mechanisms, applies also to the new ICS and thus includes several 
references to such evolution throughout this article. 
1. State-to-State Arbitration 
Regarding State-to-State arbitration, the investor’s home State 
has a discretionary right to protect its nationals by diplomatic means. 
The State’s full discretion concerns the commencement, prosecution 
and settlement of the claim, as well as the payment of damages,37 if 
awarded by the arbitrators.38 A risk of politicization may thus arise 
insofar as the State decides whether to initiate a dispute based on the 
investor’s economic and political power (and his ability to persuade 
and lobby the government in a more or less transparent manner) 
rather than on the legal soundness of his claim.39 Diplomatic 
protection, especially in the case of investment disputes, is apt to 
create political and legal uncertainty and can be used in an arbitrary 
fashion; therefore, it may impair the fairness and effectiveness of the 
                                                                                                                                     
37. See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), Judgment, P.C.I.J. A-2, 
ICGJ 236 [1924], ¶ 12, (“. . . it is an elementary principle of international law that a State. . . 
[b]y taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or 
international judicial proceedings on his behalf . . . is in reality asserting its own rights – its 
right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.”). 
38. See Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory 
of Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 2 (2015). 
See generally Kate Parlett, Diplomatic Protection and Investment Arbitration, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM CLINICAL 
ISOLATION TO SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION? 211-30 (Rainer Hofmann, & Christian J. Tams eds., 
2011); Peter Muchlinski, The Diplomatic Protection of Foreign Investors: a Tale of Judicial 
Caution, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR 
OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, 341-62 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009) (writing on diplomatic 
protection and investment adjudication); Gary Born, A New Generation of International 
Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775 (2012); Susan D. Franck, The ICSID Effect? Considering 
Potential Variations in Arbitration Awards, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 825 (2011); Ben Juratowitch, 
The Relationship Between Diplomatic Protection and Investment Treaties, 23 ICSID REV.––
FOREIGN INV. L.J. 10 (2008). 
39. See, e.g., Christoph Schreuer, Investment Protection and International Relations, in 
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS—LIBER AMICORUM HANSPETER NEUHOLD 345 
(August Reinisch, & Ursula Kriebaum eds., 2007); Christoph Schreuer, Do We Need 
Investment Arbitration?, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT 1 (2014), https://www.transnational-
dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2026. 
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system concerned. As emphasized by Joseph Weiler, “the bigger the 
economic stake, the more powerful the multinational,” the more likely 
investors “are to get the ear of a government which will espouse their 
case.”40 
If State-to-State arbitration is the only dispute resolution system 
available, the risk of politicization can still also arise because a 
government may be inclined (or disinclined) to take up the cause of 
an investor due to the political and economic advantages (or 
disadvantages) of bringing an international action against another 
State – that is, due to the nature and importance of the political 
interests that underpin its relationship with the State hosting the 
investment. The espousal of a claim often depends on the interests of 
the State rather than those of the investor, as observed by Michael 
Reisman when he speaks of “the caprice of sovereign-to-sovereign 
politics.”41 Moreover, national authorities may put pressure on 
international arbitrators in order to avoid a “debacle,” which could 
seriously damage the State’s international reputation.42 An additional 
risk is that once a State-to-State dispute has been initiated, investors 
will have no control over the proceedings started by their home State, 
with the ultimate consequence of being left out of the process 
altogether.43 Having said this, however, Section III will show that 
State-to-State arbitration should not be abandoned as such, but rather 
included in the EU’s international agreements along with investor-
State adjudication.44 
2. National Jurisdictions 
If domestic judicial proceedings are the only other course of 
action available besides State-to-State arbitration, investors are forced 
                                                                                                                                     
40. Joseph H. H. Weiler, European Hypocrisy: TTIP and ISDS, EJILTALK.ORG (Jan. 21, 
2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/european-hypocrisy-ttip-and-isds. See also Freya Baetens, 
Transatlantic Investment Treaty Protection – A Response to Poulsen, Bonnitcha and Yackee 9 
(Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.ceps.eu/publications/transatlantic-investment-treaty-protection-
%E2%80%93-response-poulsen-bonnitcha-and-yackee. 
41. See Ecuador v. United States, Expert Opinion with Respect to Jurisdiction in the 
Interstate Arbitration Initiated by Ecuador Against the United States, 20-21, ¶ 37 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb., 2012). 
42. See Weiler, supra note 40. 
43. See Armand de Mestral, Investor-State Arbitration between Developed Democratic 
Countries, CIGI 32 (Sept. 2015), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/isa_
paper_series_no.1.pdf. 
44. On this point, see infra Section III.A. 
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to bring their claims solely before the courts of the host State.45 Thus, 
there is a risk of politicization and partiality because domestic 
jurisdictions may be induced to rule in favor of the host State in 
response to national authorities wishing to avoid paying compensation 
– and transferring State money – to foreign investors. Therefore, a 
distinction could be made based on the reliability of a national court 
depending on the country concerned. Indeed, the rationale for 
investor-State adjudication seems less obvious in the case of 
agreements between the EU and developed capital-exporting 
countries than in that of EU agreements with developing countries – 
which are generally also capital-importing countries.46 As noted in a 
statement on investor-State arbitration in the TTIP submitted to the 
European Commission by a group of academics (in the framework of 
the public consultation launched on March 27, 2014 and concluded on 
July 13, 2014, discussed above), it is difficult to argue investors in the 
US-EU context have reason to worry in either region. Indeed, 
investor-State arbitration, inserted in international agreements, was 
traditionally aimed at attracting investments made in developing 
countries with weak legal and judicial systems. In the case of bilateral 
agreements between developed and developing countries, there has 
always been a concern that the courts of a developing country may 
fail to ensure the same degree of impartiality and fairness as is 
expected of the judiciary in a developed democracy, thus making it 
necessary to resort to an arbitral tribunal chosen by the parties and 
called upon to apply procedural and substantive rules known in 
advance to both parties. 
As to the more problematic question of whether domestic courts 
alone or with investor-State tribunals should settle disputes arising out 
of trade and investment agreements between the EU and non-EU 
developed countries, there seem to be at least three reasons for 
keeping international adjudication (rather than traditional arbitration) 
in this case. First, domestic proceedings can be lengthy, taking more 
time than proceedings before investment tribunals, which contradicts 
the aim of ensuring the speedy resolution of disputes.47 
                                                                                                                                     
45. Yet, it might be that a clause on commercial arbitration is included in the contracts 
negotiated by the investor. 
46. However, countries such as China, albeit their status as a capital-exporting country, 
are still considered developing States. 
47. See European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration (EFILA), A Response 
to the Criticism against ISDS, 33 J. INT’L ARB. 1, 28 (2016) (noting that, although the average 
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Secondly, from the point of view of foreign investors, it is not 
certain that all of the EU’s Member States provide for internal 
remedies allowing investors to challenge decisions by public 
authorities. Moreover, as confirmed by a number of reports by 
international organizations such as the World Economic Forum and 
documents by EU institutions, not all judiciaries in the EU have been 
exempt from strong criticism in relation to their quality, 
independence, and efficiency.48 As a result, it is not surprising that 
countries such as the United States greatly support the insertion of 
investor-State arbitration in their agreements with the EU.49 As noted 
in the literature, one may wonder why EU Member States have been 
reluctant to abandon their BITs with new Member States formerly 
part of the Communist Bloc if they esteem that their nationals will be 
granted equal protection under EU law or under the laws of the new 
Member States.50 Conversely, from the standpoint of the EU, the 
omission of an investor-State adjudication system from the 
agreements with third countries may entail serious consequences as 
far as countries with weak judicial systems are concerned. For 
instance, with respect to the TTIP, the UK House of Lords’ European 
Union Committee, in its 14th Report of Session 2013–14, recognized 
that their inclusion could add vital precedential value in advance of 
similar agreements with nations like China.51 An alternative could be 
to avoid inserting the system only in the agreements with developed, 
Western democracies. Yet, this approach would be difficult to justify 
vis-à-vis the developing countries with which the EU has already 
negotiated agreements containing a provision on investor-State 
adjudication. In any event, such an asymmetry could lead to 
dangerous disparities since the judicial organs of the EU and Member 
States would have jurisdiction over certain foreign investors but not 
                                                                                                                                     
BIT arbitration takes three years, this is still faster than what it is needed to exhaust available 
remedies in many developed national judicial systems). 
48. See GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2015-2016, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 
http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/ (providing data, 
statistics and rankings on global investment disputes); see also EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE 
2015 EU JUSTICE SCOREBOARD (2015), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-
justice/files/justice_scoreboard_2015_en.pdf. 
49. See de Mestral, supra note 43, at 7-8 (giving insight on the NAFTA case law). 
50. See id. at 7. 
51. EU Committee Fourteenth Report: The Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, Content of the TTIP, Ch. 3, ¶ 169 (2014), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/ld201314/ldselect/ldeucom/179/17906.htm#a42. 
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others, with different treatment accorded to private parties on the 
basis of their country of nationality. 
Thirdly, rulings by different Member States’ national courts may 
cause inconsistencies and result in a lack of legal certainty, putting 
foreign investors at a disadvantage. In this regard, the problem with a 
system based solely on domestic jurisdictions is that national courts 
may have different approaches to a number of matters, such as the 
recognition of the immunity of the host State, the interpretation of the 
notion of property, the definition of “indirect expropriation” and the 
scope and extent of compensation, in spite of the obligations arising 
from customary law and Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR.52 In this 
perspective, and with respect to the TTIP, the claim that the United 
States would be willing to rely specifically on internal remedies and 
conclude an agreement with the EU even without an investor-State 
adjudication system (as was the case with their agreement with 
Australia53) cannot be accepted per se precisely because of the 
fundamental difference between a bilateral agreement with a third 
State and an agreement with an international organization (and its 
members), especially in the light of the problems arising from the 
existence of a supranational court and the risks connected to the 
diversity of court decisions among the 28 EU Member States.54 
B. Lack of Direct Effect of EU Free Trade Agreements 
Another important reason why a system of investor-State 
adjudication seems to be of great importance for EU agreements is 
that it offers investors remedies that may not otherwise be available, 
at least under current EU law relating to the status of international 
agreements in domestic legal systems. This issue can be better 
understood by looking at the debate on the TTIP that took place 
amongst the EU Member States, from which emerged that some 
governments, including that of France, stressed the need to assign 
domestic (i.e., national and EU) courts a stronger role than the one 
                                                                                                                                     
52. See CHRISTOPH GRABENWARTER, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: 
COMMENTARY 359-71 (2014) (analyzing the ECtHR’s relevant case law on the provision). 
53. See generally Austl.–U.S. Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, A.T.S. 1 
(AUSFTA). 
54. This applies especially with regard to the different level of protection granted to 
investors. 
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envisaged in the text of CETA 201455 as reported by the Commission 
in its Concept Paper of May 2015.56 
1. Role of the CJEU 
Typically, domestic courts could enforce jurisdiction mainly 
through inclusion of either an explicit incentive for investors to bring 
the matter before national courts or a mandatory rule of prior 
exhaustion of local remedies in the agreement, according to which 
individuals can bring a claim before international tribunals upon the 
condition that they exhausted all domestic avenues of redress. An 
alternative could be to give investors the right to choose between 
bringing an action before a domestic court or, by virtue of an 
investor-State dispute settlement clause, before an international 
tribunal (the so-called “fork in the road”). A drastic solution would be 
to exclude investor-State adjudication altogether, where consequently 
only domestic judges would be competent to settle disputes between 
the parties to the agreement.57 
However, such a revaluation of the role of domestic 
jurisdictions, no matter the intensity, would raise issues with regard to 
the level of judicial effectiveness ensured by local remedies. 
Specifically for the EU, the question is whether foreign investors 
affected by Member States and/or EU measures could effectively 
invoke the provisions of a free trade agreement (1) before the CJEU, 
in order to challenge the legality of EU acts pursuant to Article 263(4) 
TFEU,58 and/or (2) before national jurisdictions, in order to challenge 
the validity of national law, to obtain an interpretation of EU law 
under Article 267 TFEU or challenge its validity under the same 
provision.59 While there is nothing preventing investors from having 
                                                                                                                                     
55. CETA 2014 is the predecessor of CETA 2016, i.e. the agreement finalized by the EU 
with Canada before the legal revision conducted by the Commission. The 2014 version of 
CETA is available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf. 
56. See Commission’s Concept Paper, supra note 10, para. IV. 
57. As opposed to the mere possibility to do so, which is implicitly or explicitly 
recognized by most BITs and FTAs, including the latest generation of agreements concluded 
by the EU. 
58. See TFEU, supra note 31, art. 263(4) (“Any natural or legal person may. . . institute 
proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual 
concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not 
entail implementing measures.”). 
59. See TFEU, supra note 31, art. 267 (“. . . the Court of Justice of the European Union 
shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of the 
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recourse to domestic courts per se, reflecting on “effectiveness” 
means assessing whether the internal avenues offered by the MS as 
well as by the EU would allow non-EU investors to effectively 
enforce their rights. This implies determining whether an investor 
may exercise his/her rights by relying directly on international law 
provisions having a direct effect. If so, the individual would be 
granted (in principle) access to a self-standing judicial remedy. 
Consequently, the inclusion of an ISDS or ICS clause would not be 
indispensable for an investor whose home State was a party to the 
agreement concluded with the EU. If, on the contrary, no such 
exercise was possible, the investor would have no access to direct 
effective judicial remedies, with the result that it would be 
inconvenient for him – in terms of duration and cost of litigation – to 
bring the treaty-based claim first before a domestic court and then 
before an international tribunal. 
In the absence of a provision of primary or secondary law 
establishing the types of effects of treaty obligations, it is up for the 
CJEU to decide on the matter. In its earlier case law, the CJEU, 
opting for a monist interpretation of the relationship between 
international law and the EU legal order, allowed private parties to 
invoke international law provisions that were sufficiently precise and 
unconditional.60 However, a brief analysis of the CJEU recent case 
law on the status of international agreements in the EU legal order is 
sufficient to show that the Court tends to deny, in concrete terms, the 
direct effect of the provisions contained in such agreements, thus 
excluding the possibility for natural and legal persons to invoke them 
before the CJEU.61 The Court62 has confirmed this approach in its 
                                                                                                                                     
Treaties; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or 
agencies of the Union.”). 
60. See Haegeman v. Belgium, 181/73, [1974] E.C.R 449, ¶ 2–6; Hauptzollamt Mainz v. 
C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A, 104/81, [1982] E.C.R ¶ 20 (identifying what are the 
conditions that international law provisions must fulfill for being invoked by individuals). 
61. See, e.g., Portugal v. Council, Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council, 
[1999] E.C.R. I-08395; Van Parys NV v. Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB), 
Case C-377/02, [2005] E.C.R. I-1465; Fabbrica Italiana Accumulatori Motocarri Montecchio 
SpA v. Council, FIAMM Joined Cases C-120/06P & C-121/06P, [2008] E.C.R. I-6513; 
Monsanto Technology LLC Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 July 2010, Case C-
428/0, 2010 I-06765 (involving WTO law). See generally Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al 
Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, [2008] I-06351 [2008] 
E.C.L.I. 461; Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland, Case C-459/03, [2006] I-
04635; The Queen, on the application of International Association of Independent Tanker 
Owners (Intertanko) and Others v. Secretary of State for Transport, Case C-308/06, [2008] I-
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Stichting Natuur en Milieu judgment,63 concerning the 1998 Aarhus 
Convention,64 where a Commission Decision authorizing The 
Netherlands to postpone the introduction of certain EU clean air 
requirements was challenged by an NGO. The application, considered 
well founded by the General Court (GC), was finally dismissed by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). The EU judges remarked that, 
according to settled case law, the provisions of an international 
agreement to which the EU is a party can be relied on in support of an 
action for annulment of an act of secondary EU legislation only where 
the nature and broad logic of that agreement do not preclude it, and 
those provisions appear to be unconditional and sufficiently precise.65 
                                                                                                                                     
04057; Commune de Mesquer v. Total France SA and Total International Ltd., Case C-188/07, 
[2008] I-04501 (involving international law outside the WTO). 
62. See generally Jacques Bourgeois, The European Court of Justice and the WTO, in 
THE EU, THE WTO, AND THE NAFTA 71-124 (Joseph H. H. ed., 2000); Christina Eckes, The 
European Court of Justice and (quasi)judicial bodies of international law, in BETWEEN 
AUTONOMY AND DEPENDENCE: THE EU LEGAL ORDER UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 85–109 (Ramses A. Wessel, & Steven Blockmans eds., 
2013); Piet Eeckhout, EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW 323-436 (2011); INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti, & Ramses A. Wessel 
eds., 2011); Pieter Jan Kuijper, ‘It Shall Contribute to . . . the Strict Observance and 
Development of International Law’, in THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
EUROPE: ANALYSES AND PERSPECTIVES ON SIXTY YEARS OF CASE LAW 589–612, 597–601 
(2013); Mario Mendez, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF EU AGREEMENTS (2013); Allan Rosas, The 
European Court of Justice and Public International Law, in THE EUROPEANISATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW – THE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE EU AND ITS MEMBER 
STATES 71-85 (Jan Wouters, André Nollkaemper, & Erika de Wet eds., 2008); Marco 
Bronckers, From “Direct Effect” to “Muted Dialogue”: Recent Developments in the 
European Courts’ Case-law on the WTO and Beyond, J. INT’L ECON. L. 885 (2008); Marco 
Bronckers, The Effect of the WTO in European Court Litigation, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 443 
(2005); John Errico, The WTO in the EU: Unwinding the Knot, CORNELL INT’L L.J. 179 
(2011); Nikolaos Lavranos, Protecting European law from international law, EUR. FOREIGN 
AFF. REV. 265 (2010); Anna Peters, The Position of International Law Within the European 
Community Legal Order, GR. Y.B INT’L L. 9 (1997); Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court 
of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi, (The Jean Monnet Ctr. Working Paper 
No. 01/09, 2009), http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/paper/the-european-court-of-justice-and-the-
international-legal-order-after-kadi/; Christina Eckes, International Law as Law of the EU: 
The Role of the ECJ, (Cleer Working Paper, June 2010), http://www.asser.nl/media/
1622/clee10-6web.pdf; Gráinne de Búrca, International Law Before the Courts: The European 
Union and the United States Compared, (NYU Sch. L., Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working 
Paper No. 14-61, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2487361 
(discussing the legal effects of international law in the EU legal order). 
63. See Council and Commission v. Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action 
Network Europe, Joined Cases C-404/12 P and C-405/12 P, [2015] E.C.L.I. 5. 
64. See generally UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, UN Doc. ECE/CEP/43 (Oct. 
30, 2001). 
65. See Stichting Natuur en Milieu, supra note 63, at ¶ 53. 
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Most importantly, the Court observed that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus 
Convention does not contain any unconditional and sufficiently 
precise obligations capable of directly regulating the legal position of 
individuals.66 The Court, in relation to bilateral trade treaties, instead, 
recognized, at least in theory, to private parties the right to directly 
invoke those agreements;67 however, this recognition has been 
contradicted by the normative choices made by EU negotiators with 
their third countries’ counterparts in the CETA 2016, the EU-Vietnam 
FTA, as well as in the 2015 TTIP Proposal. The same holds true for 
those FTAs that have been already concluded, are now in force and 
do not include investment chapters. All these agreements have a 
clause which leaves no room for doubt.68 
For instance, Article 8 of the Council decision on the FTA with 
Korea reads: “[T]he agreement shall not be construed as conferring 
rights or imposing obligations which can be directly invoked before 
Union or Member State courts and tribunal.”69 The draft FTA with 
Vietnam provisional Article X.19, entitled “No Direct Effect”, 
Chapter XX, provides that “nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed as conferring rights or imposing obligations on persons, 
other than those created between the Parties under public international 
law.” Furthermore, Article 30(6) of CETA 2016, which mirrors 
Article 14(16) of CETA 2014, states that “nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed…as permitting this Agreement to be directly 
invoked in the domestic legal systems of the Parties,” where the 
expression “domestic legal systems” is to be understood as 
                                                                                                                                     
66. See Stichting Natuur en Milieu, supra note 63, at ¶¶ 46-47. 
67. See e.g., Igor Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación 
Española de Fútbol, Case C-265/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-02579, ¶¶ 20-29. 
68. See generally EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement; EU-Colombia Free Trade 
Agreement; EU-Peru Free Trade Agreement, EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement; EU-Viet. 
Free Trade Agreement, supra note 3; CETA, supra note 3. See Aliki Semertzi, The preclusion 
of direct effect in the recently concluded EU free trade agreements, COMMON MKT. L. REV. 
1125 (2014) (providing an interesting survey of agreements). 
69. Council Decision, 2011/265/EU (on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, 
and provisional application of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its 
Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part), art. 8, 2011 O.J. 
2011, L 127/1. The FTA with Singapore reads: “For greater certainty, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed as conferring rights or imposing obligations on persons, other 
than those created between the Parties under public international law”. See Free Trade 
Agreement, EU-Sing., art. 17.15, authentic text as of May 2015 (pending formal approval by 
the European Commission, Council of Ministers, and ratification by the European Parliament). 
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comprising both national and EU legal orders.70 Moreover, on one 
hand, the CJEU affirmed that if the Parties decided to define in the 
agreement the scope of the rights and obligations arising from the 
treaty, the Court itself will abide by that choice.71 On the other hand, 
it made clear that international agreements are self-executing “only 
where the nature and the broad logic of the latter do not preclude 
this.”72 The above-mentioned clause prevents investors from directly 
invoking the treaties, not only before Member States’ courts but also 
before the CJEU. From this, it follows that FTAs will get the same 
treatment, mutatis mutandis, as that accorded by the CJEU to WTO 
law.73 
2. Effective Judicial Protection 
The lack of direct effect of FTAs clearly represents an obstacle 
to ensure an effective system of judicial protection of individual 
rights.74 In fact, denying access to domestic courts blunts the impact 
of such agreements on daily life, reducing the courts’ efficacy and 
leaving their potential unrealized. The effectiveness of EU law itself 
has been ensured over the years only through the CJEU’s recognition 
of direct effect – combined with the application of the principle of 
supremacy – and its qualification as a matter of both human rights and 
                                                                                                                                     
70. Even though Article 30(6) does not expressly identify the judicial bodies concerned, 
in contrast with the text contained in other FTAs. See Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA), Can.-E.U., art. 30.6, draft finalized Sept. 2014 (Pending internal approval 
process in Canada and the European Union), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014
/september/tradoc_152806.pdf. 
71. See Air Transport Association of America & Others v. Secretary of State for Energy 
and Climate Change, Case C-366/10, [2011] E.C.R. I-13755, ¶ 49 (noting that “European 
Union institutions which have power to negotiate and conclude an international agreement are 
free to agree with the third States concerned what effect the provisions of the agreement are to 
have in the internal legal order of the contracting parties”). 
72. See Intertanko and Others, Case C-308/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-4057, ¶ 45. 
73. See Antonello Tancredi, On the Absence of Direct Effect of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body’s Decisions in the EU Legal Order, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE 
EU, supra note 62, at 249-68. 
74. See Marise Cremona, Guest Editorial, Negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 354-62 (2015); Marco Bronckers, 
Is Investor–State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Superior to Litigation Before Domestic Courts? 
An EU View on Bilateral Trade Agreements, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 655, 662-64, 674-76 (2015) 
[hereinafter Is Investor-State Dispute Settlement]; Daniel Thym, The Missing Link: Direct 
Effect, CETA/TTIP and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, EU L. ANALYSIS (Jan. 7, 2015) 
(observing that the denial of direct effect of a free trade and investment agreement constitutes 
a “stumbling block” for its long-term success), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.it/2015/01/the-
missing-link-direct-effect-cetattip.html; see also TTIP Consultation, supra note 4. 
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market integration.75 Therefore, an investor-State adjudication 
mechanism seems to be necessary, at least as long as the approach of 
the EU to the incorporation of international law in the EU system 
remains unchanged (i.e., as long as this mechanism is the only one 
currently capable of providing a direct procedural remedy to foreign 
investors). 
The other possible option is to recognize the indirect effect of 
international agreements, but it does not seem to be the best 
alternative. In other words, the issue is whether that recognition, 
through the principle of consistent interpretation, could adequately 
protect the interests and rights of investors claiming to be the victim 
of a violation by EU or national authorities.76 According to said 
principle, both national courts and the CJEU must interpret the law in 
a manner consistent with the agreement itself, which operates as a 
parameter of legitimacy in the EU legal order, within the limits of the 
established case law.77 The problem with consistent interpretation is 
that it confers so much discretion on domestic courts that uniformity 
and legal certainty may be endangered at the expense of foreign 
investors, especially given the existence of 28 different jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, it does not seem a satisfactory path as the requirements 
                                                                                                                                     
75. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Transformative Transatlantic Free Trade Agreements 
without Rights and Remedies of Citizens?, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L., 579, 583-84, 594 (2015) 
(remarking on the human rights dimension implied in the legal discourse on direct effect of 
free trade and investment agreements); see Is Investor-State Dispute Settlement, supra note 74, 
at 675 (commenting on the market integration dimension of direct effect recognition). 
76. See generally Federico Casolari, International Law within the EU Legal Order: The 
Doctrine of Consistent Interpretation, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE EU, supra 
note 62, at 395-415; Gaetano Iorio Fiorelli, WTO as a parameter for the EC legislation 
through the “consistent interpretation” doctrine, in THE ABSENCE OF DIRECT EFFECT OF WTO 
IN THE EC AND IN OTHER COUNTRIES 121-33 (Claudio Dordi, ed., 2010); Giacomo Gattinara, 
Consistent Interpretation of WTO Rulings in the EU Legal Order?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AS LAW OF THE EU, supra note 62, at 269-87; Gerrit Betlem & André Nollkaemper, Giving 
Effect to Public International Law and European Community Law before Domestic Courts. A 
Comparative Analysis of the Practice of Consistent Interpretation, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L., 569 
(2003); Jan-Peter Hix, Indirect Effect of International Agreement: Consistent Interpretation 
and Other Forms of Judicial Accommodation of WTO Law by the EU Courts and US Courts, 
(Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 03/13, 2013), http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/paper/indirect-
effect-of-international-agreements-consistent-interpretation-and-other-forms-of-judicial-
accommodation-of-wto-law-by-the-eu-courts-and-the-us-courts-2/ (giving general 
considerations concerning the doctrine of consistent interpretation, as applied by the CJEU to 
international law). 
77. See, e.g., Interfood GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Ericus, Case C-92/71, [1972] 
E.C.R. 231; Hauptzollamt Mainz v. CA Kupferberg & Cie KG, Case C-104/81, [1982] E.C.R. 
3644; Fediol v. Commission, Case C-70/87, [1989] E.C.R. 1825; Nakajima v Council, Case C-
69/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-2169. 
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for indirect effect are only slightly more relaxed than those for direct 
effect. In any event, it is beyond doubt that by relying on the indirect 
effect of international agreements’ provisions, such as a reading of 
EU legislation that cannot be per se contra legem, an individual does 
not seek to challenge the legality of a domestic measure but merely 
wants to have that provision interpreted in a favorable way.78 This 
means that, while not unimportant, the impact of such an action is 
limited79 in scope.80 
In light of the foregoing, one may conclude that FTAs that 
contain a clause on the preclusion of direct effect, but no provision on 
investor-State adjudication, are a step back in terms of protection of 
individual rights. At present, a system of investor-State dispute 
settlement – even though “external” to the EU legal order as well as 
to national ones – appears to be the only solution to ensure an 
advanced form of judicial protection to investors. Having said this, 
the situation would certainly be different where the agreement 
contains no clause precluding direct effect, and consequentially 
private enforcement before domestic courts is possible. In this 
respect, what the EU should do is depart from its current approach 
and give domestic courts (the CJEU and national judges) the power to 
adjudicate claims submitted by private parties. On one hand, FTAs 
should not preclude the direct effect of the provisions they contain. 
On the other hand, the CJEU should take action since it is responsible 
for deciding whether to recognize direct effect and, as stated in the 
Kupferberg case, the existence of an institutional framework for 
settling disputes between the parties to an agreement “is not in itself 
sufficient to exclude all judicial application of that agreement.”81 
                                                                                                                                     
78. See, e.g., Federico Casolari, L’INCORPORAZIONE DEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 
NELL’ORDINAMENTO DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA, 336-350, 345-346 (2008) (It.). 
79. See Is Investor–State Dispute Settlement, supra note 74, at 665. 
80. It is limited in scope – with different conditions and objectives – also Article 340 
TFEU, in that it confers upon investors the right to right to rely on such provision to ask for 
compensation damages for wrongful behaviour on the part of EU institutions; see on this point 
Francesco Munari, Chiara Cellerino, General Principles of EU law and international 
investment arbitration, in DIRITTO DEL COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE, 2015, 115, at 136 
(examining the potential of Article 340 TFEU). 
81. See Hauptzollamt Mainz v. CA Kapferberg and Cie KG, C-104/81, [1982] E.C.R. 
3664, ¶ 20; see also Beatrice Bonafé, Direct Effect of International Agreements in the EU 
Legal Order: Does it Depend on the Existence of an International Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE EU, supra note 62, 229-48 (explaining 
the interplay between direct effect and the existence of a court in international agreements). 
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Regarding the case of agreements concluded with partners of the 
EU, whose legal systems do not provide for self-executing rights 
deriving from international law provisions, the recognition of direct 
effect by the EU and Member States would arguably create an 
asymmetry between the parties to the agreement and might be 
unprofitable for both European and national institutions. This 
argument first does not fully take into account the case law of the 
CJEU, in which the Court observes that such divergence “is not in 
itself such as to constitute a lack of reciprocity in the implementation 
of the agreement.”82 Secondly, it does not address the key role of the 
protection of justiciable fundamental rights, to which the principle of 
reciprocity does not apply.83 
In any event, should FTAs be granted direct effect in the future, 
the rule of prior exhaustion of local remedies may apply in principle. 
While this rule, as previously noted, cannot produce any effet utile if 
and when direct effect is excluded, its recognition would allow 
private parties to effectively bring their claims first before domestic 
courts, so that if unsuccessful, they may later have recourse to 
investor-State tribunals. However, this cannot obscure the fact that 
additional problems attached to the involvement of national courts 
still remain. As underlined above, they concern the fragmentation of 
rulings caused by the 28 jurisdictions, as well as the different level of 
investment protection (at both procedural and substantive levels) 
ensured by national courts. It is beyond doubt that in order to secure 
an effective system of investment disputes settlement, Member States 
and the EU should find a way to reduce the obstacles implied in many 
national judicial systems as much as possible. A substantial 
homogeneity and adequate protection of investor’s rights might be 
guaranteed by the involvement of the CJEU should the investor be 
dissatisfied with rulings delivered by a court of a Member State and 
the national court be inclined (or obliged) to request the Court to give 
a ruling, in accordance with Article 267 TFEU. 
                                                                                                                                     
82. See CA Kapferberg and Cie KG, [1982] E.C.R. 3664, ¶ 18. 
83. See Is Investor-State Dispute Settlement, supra note 74, at 672, 675. 
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II. DANGEROUS LIAISONS BETWEEN INVESTOR-STATE 
ADJUDICATION AND THE CJEU: THE PRINCIPLE OF 
AUTONOMY OF EU LAW UNDER ATTACK 
A. Inevitable Clashes for Intra-EU BITs 
Conflict of laws has been a challenging subject for the EU and 
its Member States starting with the drafting of the 1968 Brussels 
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters.84 With the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the EU has attempted to resolve the 
controversies in private international law conventions by undertaking 
the “communitarization” of private international law.85 In addition, 
the Amsterdam Treaty gave the European Parliament powers to veto 
and regulate other commercial treaties, and adjust them toward 
applicable EU law. Despite these efforts, it has turned into complex 
jurisdictional clashes between two different international legal 
regimes in what George Bermann called the “distant worlds of EU 
and international arbitration law.”86 
If international commercial treaties have been reconciled with 
EU law norms, in contrast the clash between Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) and EU law has been dramatic. The Treaty of Lisbon 
aimed to reconcile some of these differences through article 351(2) 
TFEU requiring Member States to take any “appropriate steps to 
eliminate the incompatibilities established” in international treaties 
incompatible with EU law. This provision, however, has been of 
limited usefulness in the clashes between BITs signed either among 
Member States of the EU (Intra-EU BITs) 87 or between a Member 
                                                                                                                                     
84. See Vera Fritz, Tessili vs. Dunlop 1976: The Political Background of Judicial 
Restraint (in BILL DAVIES AND FERNANDA NICOLA EDS., EU LAW STORIES: CONTEXTUAL 
AND CRITICAL HISTORIES OF EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE (2016 forthcoming) (on file with 
author). 
85. See Fausto Pocar, The “Communitarization” of Private International Law and its 
Impact on the External Relations of the European Union, in THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF 
EC PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN FAMILY AND SUCCESSION MATERS 3-15 (Alberto 
Malatesta, Stafania Bariatti & Fausto Pocar eds., 2008). 
86. See George Bermann, supra note 28, at 400. 
87. See Konstanze von Papp, Solving Conflicts with International Investment Treaty Law 
from an EU Law Perspective: Article 351 TFEU Revisited, 42 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. 
INTEGRATION 325 (2015), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2726550 (“It will be 
argued that the current reading of Article 351 TFEU is of limited usefulness, since it is overly 
restrictive and ultimately concerned with fostering EU supremacy in external relations.”). 
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State and a non-EU State (Extra EU-BITs).88 This part focuses on the 
intra-BITs that create an obvious challenge to the EU legal order 
especially due to the fact that a number of them were agreed around 
the 1990s, well before the EU enlargement of 2004. Therefore, many 
BITs were concluded between the wealthy existing EU Member 
States whose investors wanted to be reassured before investing in the 
former Eastern European States eventually known as the “EU 13” 
block. By 2014, when the EU 13 countries had all become EU 
members, the Intra-EU BITs were not eliminated but rather kept as 
guarantees of protection from expropriation without compensation 
and arbitration procedures. 
As a result, the Commission has through infringement 
proceedings asked Member States to terminate existing Intra-EU BITs 
that are contrary to EU law.89 Paradoxically, today European investors 
might want to maintain their benefits under BITs because the 
independence of the judiciary in both Hungary and Poland is at risk in 
these Member States.90 However, the fact that BITs confer rights only 
to investors from some Member states and not others creates a 
discrimination based on nationality that is incompatible with EU law 
and reinstated by CJEU case law. Yet it is hard to adapt ISDS clauses 
because international investment arbitration includes other 
organizations such as the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (“ICSID”). The ICSID convention plays an 
important role in the inflexibility of the BITs to adapt to EU law. For 
example, in terms of jurisdiction, the ICSID convention allows the 
arbitral tribunal to assert final jurisdiction over a dispute, which 
creates a major irritant for EU law and the potential conflict with 
CJEU jurisprudence.91 Even though there may be some conflicts in 
the interpretation of BITs and EU law by arbitrators in an investor-
                                                                                                                                     
88. See Bermann, supra note 28, at 440. 
89. See Commission Press Release, IP/15/5198 (Jun. 18, 2015), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5198_en.htm. 
90. See Commission, Fact Sheet, College Orientation Debate on recent developments in 
Poland and the Rule of Law Framework: Questions & Answers, (Jan. 13, 2016), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-62_it.htm; Kim Scheppele, EU Commission v. 
Hungary: The Case for the Systemic Infringement Action, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Nov. 22, 
2013), http://verfassungsblog.de/eu-commission-v-hungary-the-case-for-the-systemic-
infringement-action/; Wojciech Sadurski, What Makes Kaczynski Tick?, I-CONNECT (Jan. 14, 
2016), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/01/what-makes-kaczynski-tick/?utm_source=
feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+I-CONnectBlog+%28I-
CONnect+Blog%29. 
91. See Bermann, supra note 28, at 439. 
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State dispute, under the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 the Commission 
has the power to halt the enforcement of the final award. 
According to George Bermann, another major reason often 
invoked by the Commission for non-enforcement of arbitral awards is 
public policy. This argument gained momentum in the case Eco Swiss 
China Time Ltd v. Benetton International NV.92 In Eco Swiss, 
Benetton licensed a Hong Kong company (Eco Swiss) to manufacture 
watches using the slogan “Benetton by Bulova.”93 The agreement 
contained a limitation that “Eco Swiss could not sell the products in 
Italy.”94 The European Commission was not given notification of the 
agreement nor its special marketing scheme, and therefore the 
agreement was in violation of EU competition law.95 Eco Swiss sued 
Benetton for damages. In application of the arbitration clause, an 
arbitral tribunal was formed under the laws of the Netherlands 
Institute of Arbitration and the substantive matter was judged in 
application of Dutch Law.96 The tribunal held Benetton liable for the 
breach of the licensing agreement and ordered the payment of 
damages. The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), however, voided 
the enforcement of the award stating that the award was issued in 
violation of EU anti-competition laws and that the enforcement of the 
award would be against public policy.97 
While the Commission has used Eco Swiss to assert that “EU 
competition policy does indeed constitute EU public policy,” the EU 
prohibition of State aids has become another major claim of non-
enforcement of arbitral awards with mixed outcomes.98 As a result EU 
law has determined that a Member State cannot provide State aid to 
an investor unless the Commission has previously approved the aid 
under its guidelines. This is a key issue when it comes to the clash 
between EU law and BITs; the Micula Brothers case has become the 
                                                                                                                                     
92. The EU Commission, based on public policy, set aside the award stating that the 
enforcement of the award would be considered a blunt violation of EU Law and ant 
competition laws. See Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International NV, Case C-
126/97, [1999] E.C.R. 3055. 
93. See Bermann, supra note 28, at 411. 
94. Id. at 411. 
95. Contrary to Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements between undertakings and 
concerted practices that might prevent or distort competition in the Member States. 
96. See Bermann, supra note 28, at 412. 
97. See id. at 413. 
98. Id. 
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paradigmatic example of a clash between two distinct bodies of law 
resulting in a complex litigation before ICSID. 
1. The Micula Brothers Case 
The Micula Brothers case has become a landmark ICSID 
decision that shows the clashes of two worlds due to an intra-EU BIT 
agreement and the prohibition of state aids in EU law. In 1988, the 
Romanian government enacted the “Emergency Government 
Ordinance” (“EGO 24”). This statute allowed some tax exemptions to 
investors, such as custom duty exemptions and other tax incentives 
(“incentives”).99 
Capitalizing on the incentives, the Micula brothers commenced 
various investments in Romania.100 In April 2003, Sweden and 
Romania signed a BIT.101 Under the BIT, the signatory States would 
(1) require each contracting party to ensure fair and equitable 
treatment of the investments by investors of the other contracting 
party (“FET clause”),102 and (2) observe any other obligation entered 
into by the State with an investor of the other contracting party with 
regard to their investment (“umbrella clause”).103 In 2007, Romania 
discontinued these incentives as part of a condition to join the 
European Union. The termination of the incentives by the Romanian 
government was the cause of action to file BIT arbitration by the 
investors. Meanwhile the brothers, Ioan and Viorel Micula, acquired 
Swedish citizenship, which allowed them to file a complaint under the 
BIT claiming unfair treatment to a foreign investor.104 
                                                                                                                                     
99. See Nikos Lavranos, Interference of the European Commission in the Enforcement of 
Arbitration Awards: The Micula Case, GLOBAL INVESTMENT PROTECTION (May 5, 2014), 
http://www.globalinvestmentprotection.com/index.php/interference-of-the-european-
commission-in-the-enforcement-of-arbitration-awards-the-micula-case/ (“. . . the incentives 
included subsides, tax breaks and custom duty exceptions for investors on machinery and raw 
materials”). 
100. They opened the following companies: European Food SA, Starmill SRL, and 
Multipack SRL. Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award, ¶ 4 (Dec. 11 
2013). 
101. Bilateral Investment Treat between the Government of Romania and the 
Government of the Kingdom of Sweden. Date of BIT signature 05/29/2002; Date of entry into 
force 04/01/2003. 
102. Sveriges Internationaella Overenskommelser, art. 3(2), [SO 2003:2], at 4-5. 
103.  See Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award at ¶ 342. 
104. See id. at 3. The Swedish citizenship allowed the Micula brothers to file a complaint 
against Romania under the FET clause (Article 3.2) because the clause protects foreign 
investors in the host country. Had they not acquired Swedish citizenship, the Micula Brothers 
could not have sued Romania under the BIT. 
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Once litigation started, Romania challenged the jurisdiction of 
ICSID. However, on September 24, 2008 the arbitral panel 
(“Tribunal”) rejected this contention and ratified its jurisdiction to 
solve the dispute.105 On the merits, the Micula brothers alleged that 
they made investments “in one of the poorest and least developed 
regions of Romania” with the expectation that the incentives would 
remain in place for ten years, and the legal change harmed their 
investment-backed expectation.106 Further, claimants argued that 
Romania failed to inform the investors that the incentives, particularly 
the raw materials incentive, would have to be reversed.107 This harm 
to the expectations, as claimed by the Micula brothers, amounted to 
an expropriation without compensation.108 Also, they argued that 
Romania breached the BIT when it failed to provide FET when it 
ceased the incentives.109 Finally, they alleged the BIT was not 
contrary to EU law because under article 9(2) of the BIT, the 
Investment Treaty would prevail in case of a conflict of laws.110 
Romania, on the other hand, argued that the claimants did not rely on 
the incentives to make their investments, or if they did, that reliance 
was unreasonable.111 Romania also contended that the changes in the 
incentive regime did not violate the BIT as its actions were 
reasonably related to a rational policy, namely EU accession.112 If the 
BIT were found to be incompatible with EU law, the latter would 
prevail on the basis of the principle lex specialis derogat legi 
                                                                                                                                     
105. See Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award at ¶¶ 284-85. 
106. See id. at ¶¶ 1, 252 (“The Claimants claim that, in reliance on those incentives, and 
in reliance on the expectation that these incentives would be maintained during a 10-year 
period, they made substantial investments in the Ştei-Nucet-Drăgăneşti disfavored region 
located in Bihor County in northwestern Romania.”). 
107. See Nikos Lavranos, Interference of the European Commission in the Enforcement 
of Arbitration Awards: The Micula v. Romania Case, GLOBAL INVESTMENT PROTECTION 
(Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.globalinvestmentprotection.com/index.php/interference-of-the-
european-commission-in-the-enforcement-of-arbitration-awards-the-micula-case/ 
(acknowledging that “some Romanian regional authorities continued to reassure the investors 
that these Incentives would be safeguarded, while other parts of the government, who were 
negotiating with the European Commission (EC) on the accession, became convinced that it 
would have to be dropped.”). 
108. Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award at ¶¶ 256, 270. 
109. Id. at ¶ 257. 
110. Id. at ¶ 294. In relying on the preservation of rights provision the claimants added 
that, even if under EU law Romania was obliged to phase out the Incentives, this would not 
excuse Romania’s alleged breaches of the BIT and international law. 
111. Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award at ¶ 132. 
112. Id. 
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generali.113 Romania also asserted that Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention would require that the BIT be interpreted in light of EU 
Law, eliminating conflicting obligations.114 Further, Romania 
prompted the tribunal to take into account the wider juridical context 
in which the BIT between Romania and Sweden was negotiated and 
concluded.115 The conclusion of the BIT was a direct consequence of 
the European Union Association Agreement in the context of 
Romania’s accession to the EU.116 
The Tribunal rejected the contention made by Romania and 
considered that the BIT and the EU law are not in conflict and 
therefore the BIT should be applied as an independent body of law.117 
The Tribunal asserted that EU law seemed to be part of the general 
scheme of applicable laws to this dispute.118 The Tribunal held that 
Romania had breached its obligation of providing a FET to the 
Micula Brothers under the BIT.119 They set forth a test to consider if 
Romania failed to provide FET, analyzing if (a) the State had made a 
promise or assurance, (b) the claimants relied on that promise or 
assurance as a matter of fact, and (c) such reliance was reasonable.120 
The Tribunal found that: (a) Romania made specific promises to the 
claimants in regards to the incentives and their duration; (b) 
Romania’s conduct had induced the claimants to believe that the 
incentives would not be taken; and (c) it was reasonable for the 
Micula Brothers to believe that the incentives were legal under 
Romanian law.121 
                                                                                                                                     
113. “Special law repeals general laws.” Id. at ¶ 310. 
114. Id. at ¶ 305. 
115. Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award at ¶ 304. 
116. See id. at ¶ 308 (“In view of the above, the Respondent contends that all substantive 
obligations contained in the BIT must be interpreted in a manner consistent with EU law. This 
includes in particular Article 64 of the Europe Agreement and Article 87 of the EC Treaty.”). 
117. See id. at ¶ 319 (“As a first step, the Tribunal notes that there is no real conflict of 
treaties. In the time period relevant to this dispute, the relevant rules of international law 
applicable to Romania and Sweden were the Europe Agreement (which entered into force on 1 
February 1995) and the BIT (which entered into force on 1 April 2003). The Accession Treaty 
was not signed until 25 April 2005, and entered into force on 1 January 2007, date on which 
the EC Treaty also entered into force with respect to Romania.”). 
118. Id. at ¶ 317. 
119. This was held by the majority of the arbitrators: Laurent Lévy and Stanimir 
Alexandrov. However, the Tribunal did not find a regulatory taking in this case. See Micula v. 
Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Separate Opinion of Georges Abi-Saab, ¶ 13 
(disagreeing that Romania’s lack of transparency amounted to a breach of FET). 
120. Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award at ¶¶ 608, 668. 
121. Id. at ¶¶ 677, 703, 721. 
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The Tribunal held that the BIT and the applicable EU laws were 
not in conflict since there was not reasonable foreseeability that 
Romania’s accession to the EU would change any provision to the 
already-negotiated BIT.122 In cases of doubt of the application and 
finality of the BIT, the tribunal stated that it must consider the 
application of the BIT in the light most favorable to the investors.123 
The main reason it held that Romania’s accession to the EU did not 
change the BIT was that Romania maintained certain provisions of 
EGO 24 that were not under EU pressure to change.124 Also, the 
majority of the arbitrators (Laurent Lévy and Stanimir Alexandrov) 
held that EGO 24 was still applicable since the BIT did not provide a 
definition of FET of investors.125 The Tribunal held that even though 
legislation is constantly evolving, the nation has to strive to protect 
the legitimate interest of its investors by acting in a procedurally 
proper manner.126 Failure to comply with these guidelines would 
result in the nation’s international liability. The monetary award 
amounted to $250 million.127 
In 2015, via a decision addressed to Romania, the Commission 
ordered a halt on payment to the investors since the award was 
                                                                                                                                     
122. See id. at ¶ 321 (stating that “the Tribunal notes that the BIT does not contain any 
reference to EU accession or to the EU. Further, the Accession Treaty did not contain any 
references to the BIT, let alone seek to modify any of the BIT’s provisions”). 
123. The Tribunal took this approach based on Saluka Investments BV (Netherlands) v. 
Czech Republic. See Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, at ¶ 504; see generally 
Saluka Investments BV (Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, IIC 210, Partial Award (Mar. 17, 
2006), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0740.pdf. 
124. See Chiristian Leathely and Alejandro Garcia, Breach of fair and equitable 
treatment standard (ICSID), ARBITRATION NOTES (Jan. 16, 2014, 4:41 PM), 
http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2014/01/16/breach-of-fair-and-equitable-treatment-standard-
icsid/ (“The tribunal reasoned that the existence of an ‘obligation’ should be determined 
according to ‘governing law’, in this case, Romanian law.”). 
125. See id. at ¶ 446. 
126. See Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, at ¶ 529 (“In the Tribunal’s 
view, the correct position is that the state may always change its legislation, being aware and 
thus taking into consideration that: (i) an investor’s legitimate expectations must be protected; 
(ii) the state’s conduct must be substantively proper (e.g., not arbitrary or discriminatory); and 
(iii) the state’s conduct must be procedurally proper (e.g., in compliance with due process and 
fair administration). If a change in legislation fails to meet these requirements, while the 
legislation may be validly amended as a matter of domestic law, the state may incur 
international liability.”). 
127. See Micula v. Romania, 2015 O.J. (L 232) 69, ¶ 27 (“The Tribunal further decided 
that Romania has to pay damages to the claimants. In total, the Tribunal awarded the claimants 
RON 376,433,229 plus interest.”). 
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incompatible with EU State aid rules.128 The principal reason for 
ordering the payment stop was that such payment would be 
considered illegal State aid since the Micula brothers would receive 
compensation in the same amount of the benefits.129 Therefore these 
benefits are in direct violation of the EU State aid rules. The role of 
EU law with respect to intra-EU BITs remains, however, a disputed 
issue as to which arbitral tribunals held certain views; if the Micula 
Brothers tribunal suggested that EU law would be part of the factual 
background to the case, by contrast, in Electrabel SA v. Hungary, the 
arbitral tribunal considered EU law to be applicable law.130 There are 
a number of pending cases in which this is an issue in dispute. A few 
years before, in Eureko v. Slovak Republic, the Tribunal decided that 
the BIT was not in violation of EU law because unlike in Micula 
Brothers, the BIT was still fully enforceable. 131 
If interpreted through the lens of the US regulatory takings 
jurisprudence, the Micula Brothers case might reach a different 
outcome. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York,132 the US 
Supreme Court formulated a comprehensive test to assess regulatory 
taking based on three elements: (1) the economic impact of the 
regulation on the particular owner;133 (2) the protection of reasonable 
                                                                                                                                     
128. See id. art. 2(1) (“Romania shall not pay out any incompatible aid referred to in 
Article 1 and shall recover any incompatible aid referred to in Article 1 which has already been 
paid out to any one of the entities constituting the single economic unit benefiting from that aid 
in partial implementation or execution of the arbitral award of 11 December 2013, as well as 
any aid paid out to any one of the entities constituting the single economic unit benefiting from 
that aid in further implementation of the arbitral award of 11 December 2013 that the 
Commission has not been made aware of or that is paid out after the date of this Decision. 2. 
Viorel Micula, Ioan Micula, S.C. European Food SA, S.C. Starmill S.R.L., S.C. Multipack, 
European Drinks SA, Rieni Drinks SA, Scandic Distilleries SA, Transilvania General Import-
Export S.R.L., and West Leasing S.R.L shall be jointly liable to repay the State aid received by 
any one of them.”). 
129. See id. at ¶ 48. 
130. See Electrabel SA v Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19 (Nov. 25, 2015). 
131. See Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2008-13, 
Final Award (Dec. 7, 2012). 
132. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
133. Id. at 124. See also JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER ET. AL, PROPERTY: LAW RULES, 
POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 1192 (Wolters Kluwer, 6th ed.) (elaborating that the greater the 
value reduction, the more likely the regulation will qualify as a taking); Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (finding that complete deprivation of any “economically 
viable use” is likely to be a taking unless the regulation denies property rights that never 
existed in the first place); accord Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 
(1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 458 U.S. 1 
(1988); Kaiser Aetna v. United States., 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (holding that the main 
characteristic of this ad-hoc test is that it has to be applied to every takings case as separate 
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or distinct investment-backed expectations;134 and (3) the character of 
the governmental action.135 
The appellant in Penn Central was UGP Properties, who owned 
the land where the Grand Central Station was erected and wanted to 
construct a 50 story-high office building above the Grand Central 
Terminal in New York City. The City’s Board of Estimates barred 
that construction based on the Landmarks Preservation Law 
(“Preservation Law”). The Board also rejected a second proposal to 
build a building with different characteristics above Grand Central. 
Due to the denial of both requests to build on the property owned by 
UGP Properties, the appellant brought suit. The appellant stated that 
the application of the Preservation Law had taken their property 
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and arbitrarily deprived them of their property without 
due process of law.136 
Justice Brennan reasoned that in deciding whether a particular 
governmental action has affected a taking, the Court must focus both 
on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the 
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.137 Justice Brennan 
concluded that the ordinance could not be considered a regulatory 
taking because the economic impact of the Preservation Law did not 
negate any benefit to the appellant.138 On the contrary, the impact of 
takings law has to be analyzed in the property as a whole and not only 
                                                                                                                                     
rather than applying a blanket formula to all of them); see also Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 
(1921). 
134. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124; see also SINGER, supra note 133, at 1194 
(explaining if a citizen has already invested substantially, reasonably relying on an existing 
statutory or regulatory scheme, then the regulation is more likely to be a taking; if the 
regulation prevents the owner from realizing an expected benefit in the future, imposing 
merely opportunity cost, it is less likely to be a taking). 
135. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. This element fluctuates between the 
governmental prerogative of enacting legislation to limit property rights without just 
compensation under the basis of “protection of the welfare,” and the limit to compensate every 
time legislation enacted limits every kind of property rights. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident 
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law”). 
(“However, if protecting the welfare is sufficient to characterize a government action as a 
legitimate regulation rather than an unconstitutional taking, then the government will be able 
to destroy property interests at will without and the takings clause will be meaningless.”); 
SINGER, supra note 133, at 1194. 
136. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 122. 
137. Id. at 133. 
138. Id. at 138. 
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on the impact that the law may have on specific parcels of the 
property.139 Further, Justice Brennan showed that there was indeed 
protection of reasonable investment-backed expectations of UGP 
Properties because the investor had obtained benefits when it leased 
Grand Central Station and such benefits negated the argument of lack 
of protection to investors.140 
Applying Justice Brennan’s reasoning to the Micula Brothers 
case, when the investor puts on one side of the scale his proprietary 
interest, the investor’s wealth allegedly taken is in fact the result of 
prior regulatory interventions that have served his interests.141 Only if 
the judge, like Justice Brennan in Penn Central, is willing to take 
apart the entitlement of the investor can he decide whether the 
investor has lost or deserves protection through compensation. 
2. Balancing the Right to Regulate for Public Policy with the Fair and 
Equitable Treatment (FET) Standard for Investors 
The crucial point in the Micula Brothers case is whether the 
State, through statements or conduct, contributed to the creation of a 
reasonable expectation of regulatory stability under the FET standard. 
For the tribunal, it is irrelevant whether the State wishes to treat the 
investors in violation of the FET standard because it is sufficient that 
it acted in a manner that would reasonably be understood to create 
such an appearance.142 The element of reasonableness cannot be 
separated from the promise, assurance, or representation, particularly 
if the promise is not contained in a contract or is otherwise not stated 
explicitly. Whether a State has created a legitimate expectation in an 
investor is thus a factual assessment that must be undertaken in 
consideration of all the surrounding circumstances.143 So, the question 
is how to assess the circumstances in light of what appears to be an 
                                                                                                                                     
139. Id. at 130. 
140. See id. at 136 (noting that UGP maintained the right to use the space as was 
originally intended, and thus could still gain from the property’s value even without building 
office space). 
141. See generally Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-
coercive State, 39 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and 
Foucault!, 15 LEGAL STUD. F. 327 (1991). 
142. Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award, ¶ 708 (2013) 
(repeating the finding that the incentives themselves gave rise to legitimate expectations of 
their duration). 
143. Id. at ¶ 669. 
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implicit promise that affects both the power of the State to regulate 
for public policy and the FET of investors. 
It is possible to trace the Penn Central test elaborated by Justice 
Brennan in the Annex on Expropriation in the Commission position in 
TTIP, in CETA 2016, and with a minimum change in the EU-
Vietnam FTA offering criteria to protect the State’s right to 
regulate.144 In particular, these agreements provide a multi-factor test 
for judges to assess the context around potential indirect 
expropriations: 
2. (a) the economic impact of the measure or series of measures, 
although the sole fact that a measure or series of measures of a 
Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an 
investment does not establish that an indirect expropriation has 
occurred; 
(b) the duration of the measure or series of measures of a Party; 
(c) the extent to which the measure or series of measures 
interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed 
expectations; and 
(d) the character of the measure or series of measures, notably 
their object, context and intent. 
3. For greater certainty, except in the rare circumstance when the 
impact of a measure or series of measures is so severe in light of 
its purpose that it appears manifestly excessive, non-
discriminatory measures of a Party that are designed and applied 
to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, 
safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations.145 
The EU-Vietnam FTA lacks only clause 2(c), addressing 
“reasonable investment expectations,” which is included in a similar 
test in the TPP’s Annex 9-B on expropriation.146 Despite these 
minimal differences, overall the test of whether there is an indirect 
expropriation or regulatory taking is nearly similar in all four FTAs, 
                                                                                                                                     
144. See 2015 TTIP Proposal, supra note 3, at Annex I; CETA, supra note 3, at Annex 
8-A. 
145. See CETA, supra note 3, at Annex 8-A. 
146. See Trans-Pacific Partnership, Annex 9-B, art. 3a(ii), n.36, Feb. 4, 2016, 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text 
[hereinafter TPP] (“For greater certainty, whether an investor’s investment-backed 
expectations are reasonable depends, to the extent relevant, on factors such as whether the 
government provided the investor with binding written assurances and the nature and extent of 
governmental regulation or the potential for government regulation in the relevant sector.”). 
1116 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1081 
demonstrating that there is no real controversy on this issue thanks to 
the legacy of Penn Central. 
Even though there are similarities between EU-Vietnam FTA 
and CETA on the FET standard, what remains highly controversial 
between the EU and the US in TTIP is the definition of the FET 
standard of investment. In the TPP, the FET is part of a minimum 
standard of treatment that is in accordance with “customary 
international law principles, including fair and equitable treatment 
and full protection and security.”147 This means that full protection 
and security are also part of the minimum standard of treatment under 
CIL, so that the host State needs to act with due diligence to secure 
and protect the investment. In contrast, CETA, the EU-Vietnam FTA, 
and TTIP depart from CIL because there is no broad notion of equity 
protection for the investors under CIL, though all the protections for 
the investors are expressly enumerated in the treaties.148 As Srilal M. 
Perera explains in two incredibly dense and thoughtful articles, the 
increasing use of CIL in investment arbitration through notions of 
equity and fairness filtrated through the FET standard has become a 
“prolific phenomenon in the past decade.”149 Perera shows that the 
dangers of “equity-based decision-making,” when applied in the 
context of the FET standard, have resulted in a “subjective, vague and 
ambiguous characteristic of those undefined terms.” As a result, 
Perera explains, with largely inconsistent awards there was no 
established criteria or a line of precedent through which to interpret 
equity-based decisions more objectively.150 Thus, the major problem 
of this evolution of interpretation of CIL to assess the FET standard is 
the subjectivity of judgments due to arbitrators’ discretion of 
interpretation. As a consequence, the degree of liability imposed as 
reparation has varied without any criteria for the standard of 
damages.151 
In light of these critiques, there is a clear divide between the 
TPP, which includes CIL in the interpretation of the FET standard, 
and CETA and EU-Vietnam FTA, which have set aside the linkage 
                                                                                                                                     
147. See TPP, supra note 146, art. 9.6. 
148. See CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.10 (covering the Treatment of investors and of 
covered investments). 
149. See Srilal M. Perera, Equity-Based Decision-Making and the Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard: Lessons From the Argentine Investment Disputes – Part I, 13 J. WORLD 
INV. & TRADE 210, 212 (2012). 
150. Id. at 213. 
151. Id. at 215. 
2016] EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF EU INVESTMENT LAW 1117 
between CIL and the FET standard. This remains one of the main 
causes of the divergence between the US and EU approaches to 
investment protection. The final legacy of Micula Brothers in CETA 
is the clarification that this agreement cannot be used to prevent the 
EU to enforce its State aid laws.152 
B.  (Extra-)EU Free Trade Agreements: How to Avoid Jurisdictional 
Clashes and Safeguard the Interpretive Monopoly of the CJEU 
1. Autonomy of the EU Legal Order and the CJEU’s Jurisprudence 
As recognized by the CJEU in its Van Gend en Loos ruling, the 
EU “constitutes a new legal order of international law,”153 that is, a 
legal order distinct from “pure” public international law. The Court 
went even further in another seminal judgment, Costa,154 where it 
observed that the law stemming from the Treaty (now Treaties) is to 
be regarded as “an independent source of law”155 and, “because of its 
special and original nature,” it cannot be overridden by domestic legal 
provisions.156 A corollary attached to the “specialty” and “originality” 
of EU law is the recognition and protection of its independence or 
autonomy.157 The content and extent of this autonomy, as well as the 
principles of supremacy and direct effect that define it, have been 
shaped and safeguarded by the CJEU over the years; it is thanks to the 
Court’s jurisprudence that the autonomy of the EU legal order has 
finally reached the status of an EU constitutional principle.158 
                                                                                                                                     
152. See Press Release, European Commission, CETA: EU and Canada Agree on New 
Approach on Investment in Trade Agreement (Feb. 29, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-399_en.htm. 
153. NV Algemene Transport v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, Case 26-
62, [1963] E.C.R. 3, 12. 
154. Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., Case 6-64, [1964] E.C.R. 1141, 594. 
155. Id.; see also Jan W. van Rossem, The Autonomy of EU Law: More is less?, in 
BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND DEPENDENCE: THE EU LEGAL ORDER UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS, 13 (Ramses A. Wessel & Steven Blockmans eds., 2013) 
(observing that in the French version of the ruling, the sentence is translated as “une source 
autonome.”). 
156. Flaminio Costa, [1964] E.C.R. 1141, 594. 
157. See Bruno de Witte, Direct Effect, Primacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order, in 
THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW, 323-262 (Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca eds., 2011); see also 
van Rossem, supra note 155, at 41-42 (commenting on the interplay between autonomy and 
sovereignty.). 
158. See generally RENÉ BARENTS, THE AUTONOMY OF COMMUNITY LAW (2004); 
Joseph H. H. Weiler & Ulrich R. Haltern, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: 
Through the Looking Glass, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411 (1996); Bruno de Witte, European Union 
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This principle has both an external and internal dimensions. 
While the latter requires that the powers of the EU institutions not be 
eroded by national authorities and that EU norms not be outlawed by 
national legal systems, the former ensures that the functioning of 
international courts do not put those powers into question and that the 
norms of international law do not supersede EU law within those 
courts.159 In particular, concerns have been raised that the autonomy 
of the EU legal order may be called into question by the investor-
State arbitration mechanisms envisaged in EU agreements with non-
EU countries.160 Similar problems arise also with regard to the 
relationship between the EU law, on one hand, and, on the other hand, 
the 2015 TTIP Proposal and the new FTAs containing ICS clauses. 
As already clarified in Section I, our analysis was conceived before 
the release of both the CETA 2016 and the EU-Vietnam FTA, thus 
taking into account especially the ISDS system. However, the risks 
for possible infringement of the EU autonomy principle concern the 
ICS as well and will be accordingly considered. 
The concerns regarding the impact of investor-State adjudication 
on the autonomy of EU legal order are based on the joint application 
of Article 19(1) of the TEU and Article 344 of the TFEU, according 
to which the interpretation and application of EU law falls under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court, as repeatedly noted by EU judges. 
Article 19(1) of the TEU demands that the Court (and only the Court) 
must “ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties 
                                                                                                                                     
Law: How Autonomous is its Legal Order? 65 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT 141 
(2010). 
159. See Bruno de Witte, A Selfish Court?: The Court of Justice and the Design of 
International Dispute Settlement Beyond the European Union, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES, 33-46 (Marise 
Cremona & Anne Thies eds., 2014) (giving an overview of the relationship between the CJEU 
and other dispute settlement systems, as well as of the external dimension of the Court’s 
action.). 
160. See EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 
39-66 (2010) (commenting on the autonomy of international arbitration); see also George 
Bermann, Reconciling European Union Law Demands with the Demands of International 
Arbitration, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1193 (2011) (providing a broad analysis of the interplay 
between EU law and arbitration). On the TTIP, see the Commission’s Concept Paper, supra 
note 10, ¶ IV.1. Concerns have been expressed with regard to the compatibility of ISDS with 
the principle of autonomy of the EU legal order. A risk of such incompatibility would exist 
especially if ISDS tribunals were to interpret EU law in a manner that would be binding on EU 
institutions. Since ISDS tribunals only interpret the international agreement in question and 
would examine EU law only as a matter of fact, one may argue that concerns related to the 
autonomy of EU law are unfounded. 
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the law is observed,” while Article 344 of the TFEU provides that 
“Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of 
settlement other than those provided for therein.” In light of these 
provisions, it becomes clear that any FTA between the EU and third 
countries must ensure that investor-State tribunals respect EU law, as 
interpreted and applied by the CJEU (and not by the tribunals on their 
own.)161 The Court has confirmed this in a number of judgments and 
opinions in which, while admitting that the EU’s treaty-making power 
comprises the creation of an international dispute settlement system 
whose institutions are vested with the authority to adopt rulings that 
are binding on the EU (including the CJEU), it has held that said 
institutions cannot render binding interpretations of EU law.162 In the 
Mox-Plant judgment, for instance, the Court made it clear that an 
international agreement cannot affect the allocation of responsibilities 
defined in the Treaties and, consequently, “the autonomy of the 
Community legal system, compliance with which the Court ensures 
under Article 220 of the EC (now Art. 19 of the TEU)”. That 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court is confirmed, in the opinion of the 
Court, by Article 344 of the TFEU, by which “Member States 
undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of the EC Treaty to any method of settlement other than 
                                                                                                                                     
161. See Angelos Dimopoulos, The Compatibility of Future EU Investment Agreements 
with EU Law, 39 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 447, 470 (2012) [hereinafter 
Compatibility of Future EU Investment Agreements]; Julie A. Maupin, Where Should Europe’s 
Investment Path Lead? Reflections on August Reinisch, “Quo Vadis Europe?”, 12 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 183, 219 (2014) (noting that it is the Court, and not the arbitrators on their 
own, that have made this determination). 
162. See Opinion 1/75, Understanding on a Local Cost Standard, [1975] E.C.R. 1355.; 
see generally Opinion C-2/13, Draft international agreement – Accession of the European 
Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms [2013] (admitting that the EU’s treaty-making power comprises the creation of an 
international dispute settlement system whose institutions are vested with the authority to 
adopt rulings that are binding on the EU (including the CJEU)); Opinion 1/09, Draft agreement 
– Creation of a unified patent litigation system, [2011] E.C.R. I-1137; Opinion 1/00, Proposed 
agreement between the European Community and non-Member States on the establishment of 
a European Common Aviation Area, [2002] E.C.R. I-3498; Opinion 2/92, Competence of the 
Community or one of its institutions to participate in the Third Revised Decision of the OECD 
on national treatment, [1995] E.C.R. 521; Opinion 1/94, Competence of the Community to 
conclude international agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual 
property, [1994] E.C.R. 5267; Opinion 1/91, Draft Agreement Between the Community, on the 
one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to 
the creation of the European Economic Area, [1991] E.C.R. 6079; Opinion 1/78, International 
Agreement on Natural Rubber, [1979] E.C.R. 2871. 
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those provided for therein.”163 In this respect, it is important to point 
out that, prima facie, Article 344 of the TFEU, which refers only to 
EU Member States, does not seem to come into play in the case of 
investor-State adjudication as this mechanism does not cover State-to-
State disputes.164 Nevertheless, in the literature it has been claimed 
that Article 344 of the TFEU could be interpreted, in theory, as 
covering situations concerning at least one State.165 This would imply 
that, if future EU FTAs are concluded as mixed agreements – as they 
most likely will be –, the outcome may be different, since it could be 
possible to question the compatibility of the agreements with the EU 
legal order on the basis of that provision.166 
As to the various CJEU opinions, the legal framework is the 
assessment of an international agreement by the CJEU in accordance 
with Article 218(11) of the TFEU as occurred in the case of the FTA 
with Singapore, for which an opinion has been requested by the 
Commission.167 Article 218(11) of the TFEU provides that “[a] 
Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or the 
Commission may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to 
whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the Treaties. 
Where the opinion of the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged 
may not enter into force unless it is amended or the Treaties are 
revised.” The rationale of this provision is to carry out a review of the 
agreement negotiated by the Commission prior to its conclusion so 
that, rather than having the Court rule on its validity in the context of 
a preliminary procedure (Article 267 of the TFEU) or of an 
annulment action (Article 263 of the TFEU), the EU institutions may 
amend the text of the treaty in order to ensure its compatibility with 
the EU treaties (unless the latter are revised.) 
                                                                                                                                     
163. See TFEU, supra note 31, art. 344, at ¶ 123. 
164. See Stephan W. Schill, Editorial: Opinion 2/13 – The End for Dispute Settlement in 
EU Trade and Investment Agreements?, 16 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 379, 384 (2015). 
165. See Konstanze Von Papp, Clash of “Autonomous Legal Orders”: Can EU Member 
State Courts Bridge the Jurisdictional Divide Between Investment Tribunals and the ECJ? A 
Plea for Direct Referral from Investment Tribunals to the ECJ, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 
1039, 1052-54 (2013). 
166. See also Marc Burgstaller, Investor-State Arbitration in EU International 
Investment Agreements with Third States, 39 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 207, 217 
n.45 (2012) (noting, in relation to Article 344 of TFEU, that the argument according to which 
investor-State arbitration clauses with third states would not be prevented from being included 
in EU free trade and investment agreements assumes that these agreements will be concluded 
as ‘pure’ EU agreements rather than mixed agreements). 
167. See supra Introduction. 
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For our purposes, it is sufficient to cite a few passages from 
Opinion 1/09 on the European and Community Patents Courts, in 
which the CJEU discussed the creation of a single European judicial 
institution for intellectual property rights with exclusive 
jurisdiction.168 
First of all, the Court stressed that “an international agreement 
concluded with third countries may confer new judicial powers” on 
the aforesaid judicial institution, provided that “it does not change the 
essential character of the function of the Court as conceived in the 
TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU).”169 
Moreover, it repeated that an international agreement may affect the 
Court’s own powers provided that the indispensable conditions for 
safeguarding the essential character of those powers are satisfied and, 
consequently, “there is no adverse effect on the autonomy of the EU 
legal order.”170 
The approach described above was reiterated with further 
emphasis in Opinion 2/13 on the accession to the European Court of 
Human Rights (“ECtHR”),171 in which the Court made clear, once 
                                                                                                                                     
168. See Roberto Baratta, National Courts as ‘Guardians’ and ‘Ordinary Courts’ of EU 
Law: Opinion 1/09 of the ECJ, 38 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 297 (2011) (writing 
from the standpoint of EU autonomy); Christina Eckes, The European Court of Justice, supra 
note 62, at 85; Matthew Parish, International Courts and the European Legal Order, 23 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 141 (2012). See also Opinion 1/91, supra note 162 (stating that the jurisdiction 
conferred on the EEA Court under Article 2(c), Article 96(1)(a), and Article 117(1) of the 
agreement is likely to adversely affect the allocation of responsibilities defined in the Treaties 
and, hence, the autonomy of the Community legal order, respect for which must be assured by 
the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 164 of the EEC Treaty. This exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Court of Justice is confirmed by Article 219 of the EEC Treaty, under which Member 
States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of that 
treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided for in the Treaty); Opinion 1/00, 
supra note 162 (holding that preservation of the autonomy of the Community legal order 
requires therefore, first, that the essential character of the powers of the Community and its 
institutions as conceived in the Treaty remain unaltered). Second, it requires that the 
procedures for ensuring uniform interpretation of the rules of the ECAA Agreement and for 
resolving disputes will not have the effect of binding the Community and its institutions, in the 
exercise of their internal powers, to a particular interpretation of the rules of Community law 
referred to in that agreement. Opinion 1/91, supra note 162, at ¶ 61-65; Opinion 1/92, Draft 
Agreement Between the Community on the One Hand, and the Countries of the European Free 
Trade Association, on the Other, Relating to the Creation of the European Economic Area, 
[1992] E.C.R. I-2821, at ¶ 32, 34. 
169. See Opinion 1/09, supra note 162. 
170. Id. 
171. Opinion of the Court (Full Court) of 18 December 2014, Accession of the European 
Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental; on 
investor-State arbitration in light of opinion 2/13 see Filippo Fontanelli, The long shadow of 
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and for all, that no body or institution other than the CJEU can 
interpret EU law in a binding way for Member States and EU 
institutions,172 nor determine the distribution of responsibility 
between a Member State and the EU.173 Therefore, the CJEU affirmed 
that it has an exclusive monopoly both in interpreting EU law and in 
allocating powers to the EU and its Member States by defining the 
scope of their competences. In Opinion 2/13, it stated that the 
exclusive interpretive monopoly would be infringed if the EU and its 
institutions, including the CJEU, were “subject to the control 
mechanisms provided for by the ECHR and, in particular, to the 
decisions and judgments of the ECtHR.”174 Indeed, “any action by the 
bodies given decision-making powers by the ECHR  . . . must not 
have the effect of binding the EU and its institutions, in the exercise 
of their internal powers, to a particular interpretation of the rules of 
EU law.”175 As far as the “allocation monopoly” is concerned, the 
Court observed, inter alia, with regard to the “co-respondent 
mechanism” envisaged in Article 3 of the draft agreement that “if the 
EU or Member States request leave to intervene as co-respondents in 
a case before the ECtHR,” they must give their reasons and fulfill the 
conditions for their participation in the procedure. 176 In doing so, the 
ECtHR would be given the power to decide on that request in the 
light of the plausibility of those reasons, that is, “to assess the rules of 
EU law governing the division of powers between the EU and its 
Member States as well as the criteria for the attribution of their acts or 
omissions, in order to adopt a final decision in that regard which 
                                                                                                                                     
Opinion 2/13 on the Commission’s proposal of an investment court system in the TTIP, on file 
with author; Schill, supra note 164 (discussing the implications of the opinion of the Court for 
investor-State arbitration). 
172. See Opinion 2/13, supra note 171, at ¶¶ 179-200 
173. Id. at ¶¶ 215-35. 
174. Id. at ¶ 181. 
175. Id. at ¶ 184 
176. Article 3.1 amends Article 36 of the ECHR (adding a paragraph 4 which reads as 
follows: “The European Union or a member State of the European Union may become a co-
respondent to proceedings by decision of the Court in the circumstances set out in the 
Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A co-respondent is a party to the case. The 
admissibility of an application shall be assessed without regard to the participation of a co-
respondent in the proceedings.”). See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, FIFTH NEGOTIATION MEETING 
BETWEEN THE CDHH AD HOC NEGOTIATION GROUP AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON 
THE ACCESSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS (June 10, 2013), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/
Meeting_reports/47_1(2013)008rev2_EN.pdf. 
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would be binding both on the Member States and on the EU.”177 It is 
precisely such review that would “interfere with the division of 
powers between the EU and its Member States.”178 
Moreover, the Court stressed the need to respect the principle of 
prior involvement, according to which the CJEU must review the 
compliance of EU measures with international obligations before an 
external body from the standpoint of both the validity and 
interpretation of EU primary and secondary law.179 As noted by the 
Court in its 2/13 Opinion, the draft agreement does not contain an 
explicit prohibition, imposed upon the ECtHR, to interpret the case 
law of the CJEU where the latter has already given a ruling on the 
same question of law as that at issue in the proceedings before the 
ECtHR. In other words, the agreement could be interpreted as giving 
the ECtHR – rather than the CJEU – the power to rule on such a 
question.180 This implies that, in order for the agreement to be in 
compliance with the prior involvement principle, a provision must be 
inserted “in such a way as to ensure that, in any case pending before 
the ECtHR, the EU is fully and systematically informed, so that the 
competent EU institution is able to assess whether the Court of Justice 
has already given a ruling on the question at issue in that case and, if 
it has not, to arrange for the prior involvement procedure to be 
initiated.”181 
Another issue raised in the 2/13 Opinion concerned the 
compatibility of the procedure set up in the agreement with EU law 
from the point of view of the scope of the CJEU’s jurisdiction. As 
clarified in the draft explanatory report of the agreement, Article 3(6) 
is intended to enable the CJEU to assess the compatibility of a 
provision of EU law with the ECtHR, meaning, in essence, that the 
Court can rule only on the “validity of a legal provision contained in 
secondary law or on the interpretation of a provision of primary 
law.”182 From this, it follows that the agreement “excludes the 
possibility of bringing a matter before the Court of Justice in order for 
it to rule on a question of interpretation of secondary law by means of 
the prior involvement procedure,” with the ultimate result that if “the 
                                                                                                                                     
177. See Opinion 2/13, supra note 171, at ¶ 224. 
178. Id. at ¶ 225. 
179. Id. at ¶¶ 236-48. 
180. Id. at ¶¶ 238-40. 
181. Id. at ¶ 241. 
182. Id. at ¶ 242. 
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Court of Justice were not allowed to provide the definitive 
interpretation of secondary law, and if the ECtHR.  . . . had itself to 
provide a particular interpretation from among the plausible options,” 
there would most certainly be “a breach of the principle that the Court 
of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction over the definitive interpretation 
of EU law.”183 
2. Applicable Law, Prior Involvement and the Allocation of Powers 
between the EU and its Member States 
The various constraints identified by the CJEU in Opinion 2/13 
with regard to the applicable law, the division of powers between the 
EU and its Member States, and the principle of prior involvement 
may extend beyond the relationship with the ECtHR, and thus 
represent a serious obstacle to the operation of other kinds of dispute 
resolution mechanisms, including investor-State arbitral tribunals. 
This is clear by looking at the Commission’s Concept Paper on the 
TTIP of May 2015, mentioned above, which observed that the 
agreement should make it clear that: (a) “the application of domestic 
law does not fall under the competence of ISDS tribunals”; (b) 
“domestic law can be taken into account by ISDS tribunals only as 
factual matter”; and (c) “any interpretations of domestic law made by 
ISDS tribunals are not binding on domestic courts.”184 
According to the Commission, therefore, the autonomy of the 
EU legal order – namely of the CJEU – could be guaranteed only if 
arbitral tribunals were required to apply international law (that is, 
both the provisions of the agreement and other rules of international 
law applicable to the parties) rather than the law of the host State. It 
should be noted that in this context, the “law of the host State” means 
national and EU law, since the latter prevails over and is part of the 
former. In this light, the exclusion of EU law from the scope of 
jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals is at odds with a general, consolidated 
trend in international investment law, which regards domestic law as 
part of the sources of law applicable to investment disputes.185 Thus, 
                                                                                                                                     
183. Id. at ¶ 246. 
184. See Commission Concept Paper, supra note 10, ¶ IV.3. 
185. See generally HEGE ELISABETH KJOS, APPLICABLE LAW IN INVESTOR-STATE 
ARBITRATION: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013); Ole 
Spiermann, Investment Arbitration: Applicable Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
1373-90 (Marc Bungenberg, Jörn Griebel, Stephan Hobe, & August Reinisch eds., 2015) 
(writing on the applicable law in investor-State arbitration from the standpoint of the 
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from the Commission’s Concept Paper it can be inferred that any 
matters that are relevant to the review of the claim brought under the 
agreement, but which are not directly governed by it, will fall outside 
the tribunals’ jurisdiction. If relevant, the interpretation of national 
and EU law will be examined only as a factual matter and will follow 
the prevailing approach taken by domestic courts and authorities; the 
legality of EU or Member States’ measures under EU or national law 
will not be reviewed. However, it is unclear what the role of the 
arbitral tribunals and their task of “taking into account” domestic 
(national and EU) law as “factual matter” actually involves. Is it 
plausible to believe that in order to apply the provisions contained in 
the agreement, no interpretation of national and/or EU law in the 
context of a proceeding before arbitral tribunals will be necessary? 
Will arbitral tribunals retain the competence to allocate powers 
between the EU and the Member States? In other words, will they 
have jurisdiction to attribute responsibility for acts or omissions that 
allegedly constitute a violation of the rights of an investor and, 
therefore, to identify the respondent in the case (i.e. the EU and/or the 
State)? Of course, these questions apply mutatis mutandis also to the 
2015 TTIP Proposal, which replaces arbitral tribunals and ISDS 
clauses with ICS mechanisms, as well as to CETA 2016 and the EU-
Vietnam FTA. Furthermore, the assonances between the tribunals 
envisaged by both agreements and the ECtHR for being both 
permanent institutions are certainly more striking than those between 
the ECtHR and investor-State arbitration. This means that as the 
relationship between the ECtHR and the CJEU was found 
problematic by the CJEU, the same may happen with regard to the 
relationship between the latter and permanent investment tribunals. 
With respect to the role of EU law in the reasoning of investment 
tribunals, it must be observed, as a preliminary consideration, that 
third-country investors usually seek to challenge EU and Member 
States’ acts and obtain monetary compensation. That being said, when 
we consider that an investment tribunal must assess whether a 
provision of a FTA has been infringed by a Member State or the EU, 
it is difficult to imagine how it could possibly do so without 
                                                                                                                                     
relationship between domestic and international law); Collins C. Ajibo, The Governing Law in 
Investor State Arbitration: the BIT, International Law, and Choice of Law Clause, INT’L ARB. 
L. REV. 125 (2015). 
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interpreting national and/or EU primary and secondary law.186 Indeed, 
investment tribunals and the CJEU may have competing jurisdiction 
with regard to issues of EU law to be applied to the dispute rather 
than to the particular circumstances of the dispute itself.187 The 
argument that investment tribunals, in examining the measures 
adopted by the EU and its Member States, should treat EU law as a 
matter of fact rather than law and confine themselves to a merely 
incidental role is unconvincing. In fact, an accurate analysis of EU 
law is an essential function to be performed by investment tribunals 
and, de facto, a precondition for assessing the compatibility of an EU 
or national legal act with the agreement.188 Although the jurisdiction 
of an investment tribunal is restricted to the adjudication of a 
particular dispute and, therefore, to the interpretation and application 
of the specific free trade and investment agreement, the assessment on 
the protection of investment standards may, by its very nature, have 
an impact on a number of EU policies such as those relating to the 
internal market, competition and trade-related matters (the 
environment, public health, labor, etc.). Furthermore, it is possible 
that investment tribunals will give a different and broader definition 
of “investment” and “investor” than that under EU law, resulting in 
foreign companies relying on the standards contained in the 
                                                                                                                                     
186. See Von Papp, supra note 165, at 1040 (citing Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, 
Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability, and Suspension, PCA Case 2008-13 (Oct. 26, 2010), 
para. 290) (“While arbitral tribunals tend to stress that their jurisdiction is limited to alleged 
breaches of the relevant BIT, this does not mean that questions of EU law remain outside the 
reach of their jurisdiction.”); Contra Schill, supra note 164, at 384-387; Stephan Schill, 
Luxembourg Limits: Conditions for Investor-State Dispute Settlement Under Future EU 
Investment Agreements, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 11 (2013), https://www.transnational-
dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1943; Angelos Dimopoulos, The Involvement of the 
EU in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Question of Responsibilities, COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 1671, 1699-1700 (2014) [hereinafter The Involvement of the EU in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement]. 
187. See Von Papp, supra note 165, at 1040. 
188. See Inge Govaere, Beware the Trojan Horse: Dispute Settlement in (Mixed) 
Agreements and the Autonomy of the EU Legal Order, in MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED 
192 (Christophe Hillion, & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2010); Steffen Hindelang, The Autonomy of 
the European Legal Order: EU Constitutional Limits to Investor-State Arbitration on the Basis 
of Future EU Investment-Related Agreements, in COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY AFTER 
LISBON: EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 1387-98, 194-95 (Marc 
Bungenberg, & Christoph Herrmann eds., 2013); H. LENK, Investor-state arbitration under 
TTIP. Resolving investment disputes in an (autonomous) EU legal order, SIEPS 2015:2 
(2015), http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/Sieps%202015_2%20web.pdf.; Schill, supra 
note 164, at 37–54. 
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investment agreement before the international tribunals (but not 
before the CJEU). 
The breach of the CJEU’s interpretive monopoly is significant 
not only because the Court could lose its exclusive jurisdiction to 
interpret and apply EU law, but also because the awards rendered by 
the tribunals, stemming directly from jurisdictional institutions 
established by the international agreement, have a binding nature; in 
order to be effective, the awards must be respected by domestic 
courts, including the CJEU.189 This applies also to CETA 2016, where 
it is stated in Article 8.41 that “[a]n award issued pursuant to this 
Section shall be binding between the disputing parties and in respect 
of that particular case” and additionally that “a disputing party shall 
recognise and comply with an award without delay.” 
Since international agreements are binding on the Member States 
and EU institutions pursuant to Article 216.2 TFEU,190 being “an 
integral part of the EU legal order”191 and in a primacy status vis-à-vis 
secondary law (but not vis-à-vis the EU treaties), the CJEU must 
interpret EU law in accordance with those agreements and the awards 
delivered by the tribunals established therein.192 Moreover, as 
investment awards are enforced in conformity with either the New 
York Convention or ICSID Convention, it is impossible for the EU to 
respect international obligations related to the enforcement of the 
awards and simultaneously to prevent their implementation in the EU 
legal order.193 What has been noted with regard to intra-EU BITs 
holds true also in the case of extra-EU agreements: an interpretation 
of EU law that is not in compliance with an investment award will 
probably induce foreign investors to bring a claim before the 
investment tribunal and potentially lead to exorbitant requests for 
compensation. Moreover, the lack of permanence and the absence of 
an official doctrine of precedence of arbitral tribunals may attenuate 
the constraints vis-à-vis the CJEU while creating additional problems 
of consistency that may endanger the relationship between the 
                                                                                                                                     
189. See generally JULIEN FOURET, ENFORCEMENT OF INVESTMENT TREATY 
ARBITRATION AWARDS: A GLOBAL GUIDE (2015). 
190.  “Agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the 
Union and on its Member States.” 
191. See Haegeman, supra note 60, [1974] E.C.R 449; Case C-366/10 Air Transport 
Association of America v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Case C-366/10, 
[2011] E.C.R. I-0000, ¶ 50. 
192. For more on the Consistent Interpretation Doctrine, see supra note 76. 
193. LENK, supra note 188, at 45. 
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tribunals and the EU legal order.194 In this respect, it remains to be 
seen whether the establishment of permanent tribunals foreseen in 
CETA 2016 and in the EU-Vietnam FTA will justify a new 
perspective on the scope and legal force of the awards once they 
become operational. Specifically, a reading of Article 8.41 of CETA 
2016 which limits the binding effect of the award to that “particular 
case” and between the disputing parties seems to exclude radical 
changes to this effect195. However, the 2015 TTIP Proposal196 does 
not include such a self-restraint dimension of investment awards, 
from the point of view of their enforcement, as there is no reference to 
the particular case or dispute. 
The above analysis implies that a mechanism of prior 
involvement of EU institutions, including the CJEU, is needed. 
Obviously, such a mechanism should not be equivalent to that 
envisaged in the draft accession agreement to the ECtHR, which has 
already been struck down by the CJEU. It could be inspired by it, 
though. Should an EU provision be interpreted in order for an 
investment tribunal to adopt a decision, the CJEU would be primarily 
enabled to interpret it and/or assess its validity in light of the FTA. 
The difference with the procedure set up in the draft accession 
agreement would be that primary law and secondary law provisions 
could be subjected to the interpretation of the Court. This could be the 
right way to avoid a negative response from the CJEU should an 
opinion on the compatibility of the FTA with EU law be requested 
pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU. In this regard, unless amended, the 
application sic et sempliciter of Article 267 TFEU (i.e., of a 
preliminary ruling procedure started by the investment tribunal and 
subject to such provision) does not seem to be the right solution since 
it lays down two cumulative conditions. First, investment tribunals 
should qualify as “tribunals” or “courts,” and second, in the exercise 
of their public authority, they should be considered as judicial bodies 
“of the Member States.”197 Regarding the first condition, as far as the 
permanent dispute settlement system foreseen in CETA 2016 and in 
the FTA with Vietnam is concerned, there do not seem to be 
                                                                                                                                     
194. But see Jürgen Basedow, EU Law in International Arbitration: Referrals to the 
European Court of Justice, J. INT’L ARB. 367, 379 (2015) (considering arbitration panels 
permanent “in an institutional sense since ICSID is a permanent arbitration institution”). 
195. See in the same vein Article 31(1), Ch. 8, of the EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 3. 
196. 2015 TTIP Proposal, supra note 3, Article 30(1). 
197. See TFEU, supra note 31, art. 267(b), 2012 O.J. C 326/47, at 164. 
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insuperable obstacles for the application of Article 267 TFEU. As to 
arbitral tribunals, the CJEU held that commercial arbitrators fall 
outside the scope of Article 267 TFEU.198 Nevertheless, it should be 
stressed that investor-State arbitration covers disputes between a State 
and an investor rather than between private parties (as in commercial 
arbitration). As a consequence, some commentators have rightly 
argued that the Court’s reasoning cannot be transferred tout court to 
this system.199 The issue raised by the second condition, however, is 
more serious. Simply considering the possibility of meeting this 
condition means assuming that the agreement concerned is a mixed 
agreement – that is, one concluded by the EU and the Member States. 
Whether or not that is the case, it is hard to find a strong basis in the 
CJEU’s case law200 for arguing that, in the context of EU agreements, 
investment tribunals can be considered judges of a Member State.201 
Another important issue arises from the analysis of the opinions 
rendered by the CJEU on a number of agreements containing 
procedures similar to that envisaged in Article 267 TFEU.202 
According to the CJEU, national judges must be considered 
“ordinary” within the EU legal order and entrusted with the task of 
implementing EU law; as such, they cannot be replaced by 
international tribunals.203 As clarified in Opinion 1/09, Article 267 
TFEU provides for the power or obligation of national courts to refer 
questions on the interpretation and validity of EU law so as to ensure 
its harmonious interpretation and application across the Union.204 
Based on the CJEU’s case law, one can thus envisage the possibility 
                                                                                                                                     
198. Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei 
Nordstern AG & Co. KG, Case 102/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1095. 
199. Steffen Hindelang, Circumventing Primacy of EU Law and the CJEU’s Judicial 
Monopoly by Resorting to Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Provided for in Inter-se Treaties? 
The Case of Intra-EU Investment Arbitration, 39 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 179, 202 
(2012) [hereinafter Circumventing Primacy of EU Law]; Von Papp, supra note 165, at 1058-
60. 
200. Paul Miles and Others v. Écoles Européennes, Case C-196/09 [2011] E.C.R. I-5139. 
201. See also Bermann, supra note 28, at 406; Burgstaller, supra note 166, at 219-20. 
Contra Jürgen Basedow, supra note 194, at 378-81; Dimopoulos, Compatibility of Future EU 
Investment Agreements, supra note 161, at 469; see also Genentech, Inc. v. Hoechst GmbH & 
Sanofi Aventis Deutschland GmbH, Case C-567/14, EU:C:2016:177, ¶ 59, n.34. 
202. See Opinion 1/91, supra note 162, at 11, 54-65; Opinion 2/92, supra note 162, at 
11, 37; Opinion 1/09, supra note 162, at 12. 
203. See Opinion 1/09, supra note 162, at ¶ 80. 
204. See Tobias Lock, Taking National Courts More Seriously? Comment on Opinion 
1/09, 4 EUR. L. REV. 576 (2011) (commenting on the impact of the Opinion on the status 
accorded to national courts). 
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of a mechanism similar to that foreseen in Article 267 TFEU only 
upon the condition that the reference to a “judge of a Member State” 
will be ruled out provided that investment tribunals are subject to the 
binding opinions rendered by the CJEU upon their request. 
An alternative to Article 267 TFEU, to be inserted in the FTAs, 
therefore, may be a solution only if it will not replicate all weaknesses 
that have been already found inconsistent with EU law by the CJEU 
in its jurisprudence. 
Having discussed the question of the applicable law and the need 
for a mechanism of prior involvement, the matter of the allocation of 
powers between the EU and Member States must be now addressed. 
In this regard, the relevant and applicable legal source that would 
allow identification of the respondent to an action brought by an 
investor is Regulation 912/2014.205 As is well known, this act 
provides a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to 
investor-to-State dispute settlement tribunals established by 
international agreements to which the EU is a party in case of 
investment disputes brought by foreign investors.206 The European 
Commission, in consultation with the Member State, undertakes 
identification of the respondent in case of disagreement; it is for the 
CJEU to determine the allocation of responsibility between the EU 
and Member States. However, Article 19 of the Regulation, which 
regulates cases where no agreement is reached, does not make any 
reference to the CJEU. This remains an issue to be clarified by EU 
institutions; other aspects need to be addressed through rules in mixed 
EU free trade and investment agreements so that the regulation may 
be complemented and rendered more effective.207 It remains to be 
seen what the CJEU will state in its future opinion on the FTA with 
Singapore since its findings will be relevant to other agreements as 
well.208 Alternatively, the CJEU could be called upon to give a 
                                                                                                                                     
205. See Directive 2014/912 art. 6 and art. 9 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Establishing a Framework for Managing Financial Responsibility Linked to 
Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement Tribunals Established by International Agreement to 
which the European Union is a party, 2014 O.J. L. 257/127. 
206. See Dimopoulos, The Involvement of the EU in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 
supra note 186; Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Financial Responsibility in European International 
Investment Policy, INT’L & COMP. L. QUARTERLY 499 (2014). 
207. See Dimopoulos, Compatibility of Future EU Investment Agreements, supra note 
161; Schill, supra note 164 (highlighting that the Statement submitted by the European 
Communities to the Secretariat of the Energy Charter pursuant to Article 26(3)(b)(ii) of the 
Energy Charter Treaty, OJ L 69, 115 (9 March 1998)). 
208. See supra note 8. 
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separate opinion for each agreement. What seems certain, however, is 
that the system established in the Regulation imposes on foreign 
investors the obligation to undergo proceedings that are lengthier and 
more complex than those envisaged for EU investors. Moreover, with 
regard to the allocation of competences between the EU and Member 
States, we can only wait and see whether third-country negotiators 
will be open to accepting the involvement of EU institutions (the 
CJEU in particular) in the course of investment proceedings. 
A final point must be made with respect to the operation of the 
principle of autonomy, and particularly the question of whether and 
how CETA 2016, the EU-Vietnam FTA and the 2015 TTIP Proposal 
take into account the need to safeguard and comply with said 
principle. 
As a preliminary remark, it is clear that the Commission 
considered Opinion 2/13 in drafting the 2015 TTIP Proposal, which 
lays as a model for both CETA 2016 and the EU-Vietnam FTA. 
Regarding the allocation of responsibility between the EU and its 
Member States, the Proposal provides that the claimant must request 
that the EU determine who is the respondent – the EU or one of its 
Member States. A similar provision is contained in CETA 2016 and 
the EU-Vietnam FTA.209 By affirming this, the Commission prevents 
the Tribunal from carrying out this assessment solely in line with the 
customary rules on State responsibility.210 The relevant act would be 
Regulation 912/2014; it will be up to the Commission, in consultation 
with the Member State, to determine which entity will act as the 
respondent. From this point of view, therefore, there are no particular 
obstacles to the establishment of investor-State adjudication. 
From the TTIP Proposal, it also emerges that the Commission 
was well aware of the Court’s findings in Opinion 2/13 with regard to 
the need to respect its interpretive monopoly. Indeed, a number of 
articles contained in the Proposal restrict the investment tribunals’ 
reliance on applicable law to international law, to the exclusion of 
national and EU law. In exercising its jurisdiction, the Tribunal can 
apply the TTIP and other rules of international law applicable 
between the parties, but not domestic law.211 Where relevant, the 
interpretation of domestic law can be assessed “as a matter of fact” 
                                                                                                                                     
209.  See CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.21; EU-Viet. Free Trade Agreement, Ch. II of Ch. 
8, Sect. 3, supra note 3, art. 6. 
210. See Fontanelli, supra note 171. 
211. See 2015 TTIP Proposal, supra note 3, arts. 13.2-13.3. 
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and must follow the prevailing interpretation of the domestic courts 
and authorities.212 Moreover, the Proposal states that the Tribunal’s 
interpretation of domestic law will not be binding upon domestic 
authorities and that they will not review the legality of State measures 
under domestic law.213 Thus, in allowing the assessment of domestic 
(national and EU) law only as a matter of fact, the Commission 
followed the approach outlined in its Concept Paper of May 2015, in 
relation to which we have already expressed our doubts. Moreover, 
the Commission affirms that the tribunals may be “required to 
ascertain the meaning” of provisions of national law.214 Considering 
investment tribunals cannot interpret EU law (if they did, they would 
breach the principle of the autonomy of the EU legal order), the 
sentence is obscure. It seems difficult, if not impossible, to draw a 
distinction between “ascertaining the meaning” of and “interpreting” 
a given provision. Again, it is hard to believe that a tribunal will or 
should not closely examine a provision of national or EU law in order 
to rule on the TTIP. In any event, relying on a supposed dividing line 
between “interpretation” and “application” does not appear decisive. 
If it is true that “interpretation” means determining the meaning of 
particular provisions of an agreement while “application” refers to the 
conformity of certain actions taken by the State(s) with the terms of 
that agreement, it is equally true that the application always involves 
interpretation which, vice versa, generally (but not always) leads to an 
application of the law. 
Finally, it must be pointed out that the Proposal does not address 
the question of prior involvement precisely because it intends to solve 
the question of the autonomy of the EU legal order and the CJEU in 
the interpretation of the treaties and secondary law ex ante, that is, by 
excluding domestic law from the applicable law. It follows that the 
problem with this exclusion lies in the fact that since most investor-
State cases will need an interpretation of EU law, the lack of a 
mechanism aimed at ensuring a sound interpretation of EU law by the 
CJEU – and thus compliance with the treaties – is capable of 
jeopardizing the feasibility of the entire proposal. 
Which of the above elements has been transposed in CETA 2016 
and in the EU-Vietnam FTA? The great majority of them: while the 
reference to the ascertainment of the meaning of domestic law’s 
                                                                                                                                     
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 13.4. 
214. Id. at 13.2. 
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provisions has been ruled out, the idea that EU law shall be excluded 
from the applicable law has been strictly followed. The same holds 
true for all corollaries attached to the narrowing of the applicable 
law’s scope and extent: (1) the treaty and international law rules and – 
this is a novelty compared to the Proposal – principles are the only 
applicable sources of law, and (2) domestic law may be interpreted 
only as a matter of fact.215 This means that the criticalities mentioned 
above on the lack of a system of prior mechanisms apply all the same. 
Moreover, as foreseen in CETA 2016 and in the EU-Vietnam FTA, 
the establishment of an appellate tribunal entrusted with a number of 
tasks aimed at reviewing awards the lower tribunal renders might 
complicate matters. Indeed, it is stated that the appellate tribunal may 
“uphold, modify or reverse a Tribunal’s award based on (a) errors in 
the application or ‘of applicable law’ and on (b) manifest errors in the 
appreciation of the facts, including the appreciation of relevant 
domestic law.”216 
In light of the above, the question of the incompatibility of a 
system of investor-State dispute settlement with the principle of 
autonomy must be taken seriously, because investment tribunals are 
naturally required to interpret EU law whether directly or indirectly 
(not simply incidentally) in order to assess the conformity of 
measures adopted by Member States or the EU with the agreement 
(and, more generally, international law). While the issue of the 
distribution of responsibility between national authorities and the EU 
could be solved by the application of Regulation 912/2014, a new 
mechanism of prior involvement of the EU, namely the CJEU and/or 
the European Commission, is needed. A mechanism inspired by the 
preliminary procedure envisaged in Article 267 TFEU but different 
than the latter in a number of aspects, as it has been already pointed 
out, might prevent investment tribunals from curtailing the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the CJEU. Needless to say, this can be an adequate 
solution only if the Court’s opinion will be regarded as binding upon 
the investment tribunals in the engagement with EU law. As 
previously mentioned, a softer alternative would institutionalize the 
intervention of the European Commission as an ex ante privileged 
interpreter of EU law before the said tribunals. 
                                                                                                                                     
215. See CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.31, at ¶ 1-2.; EU-Viet. Free Trade Agreement, Ch. II 
of Ch. 8, Sect. 3, supra note 3, art. 16, ¶ 2. 
216. See CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.28, at ¶ 2; EU-Viet. Free Trade Agreement, Ch. II of 
Ch. 8, Sect. 3, supra note 3, art. 13, ¶ 2. 
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Another solution could be to opt for a procedure that follows the 
legal framework set up by the Agreement on the European Economic 
Area (“EEA Agreement”) vis-á-vis the relationship between the 
European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”) Court and the EU,217 and 
draw from it possible solutions for ensuring the respect of the 
principle of autonomy in relation to the functioning of the investment 
tribunals established by free trade and investment agreements. The 
EEA Agreement, along with its annexes and protocols, contains a 
number of provisions aimed at preventing conflicts with the EU legal 
order. A system of continuous exchange of information between 
EFTA, EEA and EU institutions is established, including between the 
EFTA Court and the CJEU. From a jurisdictional viewpoint, the EEA 
Agreement puts in place a system aimed at preserving a homogeneous 
interpretation of the Agreement, i.e. at ensuring that EU law and the 
CJEU’s case law are not contradicted by the EFTA Court.218 In this 
respect, an important tool envisaged in the Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure of the EFTA Court is represented by the role assigned to 
the European Commission. From a joint reading of Article 36 of the 
EFTA Court Statute and Article 89 of the Rules of Procedures, it can 
be inferred that the Commission has both jus standi and jus locus 
standi in judicio before the EFTA Court. So far the Commission has 
always submitted its written observations in the disputes before the 
Court, and as a result has exerted a strong influence on the case law 
tendencies of the latter. Regarding investor-State proceedings, a 
possible strategy aimed at protecting the autonomy of EU law could 
be to institutionalize the intervention of the Commission for all 
disputes so that it may act as a privileged (and authentic) interpreter 
of EU law in all cases brought before the tribunal when interpreting 
EU law is the precondition for the settlement of a dispute. Of course, 
it remains to be seen whether the CJEU would accept this mechanism, 
considering that in this case the Commission (rather than the Court) 
                                                                                                                                     
217. See Daniele Gallo, From Autonomy to Full Deference in the Relationship between 
the EFTA Court and the ECJ: The Case of the International Exhaustion of the Rights 
Conferred by a Trademark 4, (Eur. U. Inst, Working Paper No. 78, 2010); see generally 
Agreement on the European Economic Area, 1994 O.J. L 1 [hereinafter EEA Agreement]. 
218. The principle/objective of “legal homogeneity” is envisaged in paragraphs 4 and 15 
of the Preamble and in Articles 1, 6, 105, 106, 107, 111 of the EEA Agreement, supra note 
217, 1994 O.J. L 1, and in Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Agreement Between the EFTA States 
on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice, 1994 O.J. L 344, 
according to which EEA law aims at creating a dynamic and homogeneous area by extending 
EC rules—EU rules as foreseen by the Treaty of Lisbon—to a wider regional context. 
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would exercise the interpretative monopoly. It is clear that the 
introduction of a prior involvement of the CJEU or the Commission 
in the interpretation of EU law would lead or, de facto, force the EU 
institutions to grant a similar right to the EU’s co-contracting parties, 
or better, their constitutional or supreme courts.219 
In conclusion, there seems to be another legal tool to be used in 
order to safeguard the principle of EU autonomy. In the 2015 TTIP 
Proposal,220 as well as in the CETA 2016221 and in the EU-Vietnam 
FTA222 it is stated that Parties (the EU and its partners), through the 
committees provided therein, where serious concerns arise as regards 
matters of interpretation of provisions on investment protection and 
resolution of disputes, “may adopt decisions interpreting those 
provisions”, which are binding on both the Tribunal and the Appeal 
Tribunal. This provision, therefore, cannot apply to a particular case 
brought before the permanent tribunals; yet it may apply pro futuro in 
order for the EU to clarify provisions to be applicable in settling 
disputes between investors and the Parties of the agreement so that 
conflicts with the EU legal order might be considerably reduced. 
III. WHAT ROLE SHOULD STATE-TO-STATE ARBITRATION AND 
(GREATER) INCLUSIVE ADJUDICATION PLAY IN EU FREE 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS? 
A. State-to-State Arbitration between Diplomatic Protection and 
Interpretive Claims and its Relationship with Investor-State Dispute 
Resolution Systems 
We have explained why, in our opinion, State-to-State 
arbitration should not be the only remedy available under EU FTAs. 
As already noted, this does not mean that State-to-State arbitration 
ought to be abandoned and replaced by investor-State arbitration or 
permanent tribunals.223 Rather, as argued below, its inclusion in EU 
agreements can only be beneficial. Therefore, this mechanism should 
be envisaged in addition to, and not as a replacement for, investor-
State adjudication. As a consequence, this Section will also 
                                                                                                                                     
219. See Schill, supra note 164, at 386. 
220. See 2015 TTIP Proposal, Ch. II, supra note 3, art. 13, ¶ 5. 
221. See CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.31, ¶ 3. 
222. See EU-Viet. Free Trade Agreement, Ch. II of Ch. 8, Sect. 3, supra note 3, art. 16, ¶ 
4. 
223. See supra Section I.A. 
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investigate possible strategies for ensuring an effective coordination 
between the two mechanisms in question. As it has been already 
noted in the previous Sections, this analysis, albeit being mostly 
devoted to investor-State arbitration, may apply also to CETA 2016 
and EU-Vietnam FTA. “May” since there is no praxis at the 
international level through which identifying the rules governing the 
relationship between State-to-State arbitration and the functions 
performed by permanent tribunals. What can be inferred from the 
reading of both CETA 2016 and the EU-Vietnam FTA is that the erga 
omnes (de jure or de facto) effect of awards that are generally 
rendered by international permanent tribunals is excluded in both 
agreements, as mentioned in the previous Section.224 In CETA 2016, 
for instance, it is laid down that “[a]n award issued pursuant to this 
Section shall be binding between the disputing parties and in respect 
of that particular case.”225 Therefore, as there seems not to exist 
relevant differences with the legal force of investor-State arbitration 
awards, the coordination mechanism concerning investor-State 
arbitration and inter-State arbitration may represent a source of 
inspiration, mutatis mutandis, also for agreements that envisage a 
system of permanent tribunals. 
It must be pointed out that earlier BITs, modeled on Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation Treaties, originally provided for State-to-
State arbitration, while investor-State arbitration clauses began to be 
introduced only in later BITs.226 More specifically, it was not until 
1969, with the Chad-Italy BIT, that the first investor-State arbitration 
clause was included in a treaty, and not until 1990 that a tribunal 
asserted its jurisdiction in a dispute between an investor and a host 
State.227 Indeed, diplomatic protection as conceived in the 1950s and 
1960s was the only mechanism that allowed States to take action to 
protect their nationals on the level of (public) international law, a 
sphere from which, at the time, non-State actors were excluded by 
definition. Due to this exclusion, the system of adjudication of 
                                                                                                                                     
224. Article 30 of the 2015 TTIP Proposal, instead, follows a different approach. See 
supra Section II.B. 
225. See CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.41, ¶ 1; EU-Viet. Free Trade Agreement, Ch. II of 
Ch. 8, Sect. 3, supra note 3, art. 31(1). 
226. For an historical overview see Roberts, supra note 38, at 2-5. For an overview of 
inter-State dispute settlement systems contained in BITs, see Paul Peters, Dispute Settlement 
Arrangements in Investment Treaties, NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 91, 102–17 (1991). 
227. See NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER, STATE–STATE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT IN INVESTMENT TREATIES: BEST PRACTICES SERIES––2014 1 (2014). 
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disputes of alien investors in a foreign State faced a serious problem 
that could only be resolved through the fictio of diplomatic protection, 
which, by treating a violation of the rights of a foreign national as a 
violation of the rights of their State of nationality, allowed the latter to 
vindicate that violation at the international level.228 
Today, nearly all modern BITs include provisions that give 
access to two avenues of dispute resolution, each with a different 
scope of ratione personae: a State-to-State clause for disputes 
concerning the interpretation and/or application of the treaty, and an 
investor-State arbitration clause to be activated in case of a violation 
of the treaty by the host State if the investor concerned has suffered 
loss or damage as a result of the violation. A good example of a 
typical BIT State-to-State dispute settlement clause can be found in 
the 2012 US Model BIT, whose Article 37 reads: “any dispute 
between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of 
this Treaty, that is not resolved through consultations or other 
diplomatic channels, shall be submitted on the request of either Party 
to arbitration for a binding decision or award by a tribunal in 
accordance with applicable rules of international law” (emphasis 
added).229 Under many treaties, however, a State can initiate a claim 
against another State on matters concerning the “interpretation and 
application” of the treaty.230 Thus, in case of disputes that have not 
been resolved through consultations or other diplomatic channels, 
claims may be brought to obtain an interpretation or, in the context of 
diplomatic protection, to seek the application of the treaty should a 
violation of any of its provisions be alleged by a contracting party and 
redress be sought by said party on behalf of its investors. While the 
purpose of diplomatic protection, like that of investor-State arbitration 
clauses,231 is to protect nationals abroad (including investors) and 
obtain reparations for internationally wrongful acts, interpretive 
claims have a different goal. Rather than reparations and damages, 
                                                                                                                                     
228. Greg Lourie, Diplomatic Protection Under the State-to-State Arbitration Clauses of 
Investment Treaties, AUS. Y.B. INT’L ARB. 511, 511 (2015). For a general discussion of this 
theme see GIORGIO SACERDOTI, BILATERAL TREATIES AND MULTILATERAL INVESTMENTS 
ON INVESTMENT PROTECTION 261-65 (1997). 
229. 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art 37, ¶1, available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf. 
230. See German Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 9, available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1025.pdf. On the notions of 
“interpretation” and “application” see Roberts, supra note 38. 
231. See NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER, supra note 227, at 3-4. 
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they simply seek clarification of the meaning and/or scope of treaty 
obligations – which is not always a precondition for determining a 
treaty breach. 
As already emphasized above,232 the boundaries between the 
concepts of “interpretation” and “application” are blurred as any 
dispute on the application of a treaty necessarily presupposes an 
interpretation of the provisions to be applied. However, although the 
application of a norm implies by its very nature the interpretation of 
that norm, the reverse, while relatively common, is not always the 
case. Indeed, the contracting parties to a treaty may well seek 
clarification of the meaning of one or more provisions that are 
unrelated to a specific situation or to a dispute regarding the violation 
of the treaty itself. Moreover, it should be noted for the sake of 
completeness that diplomatic protection claims are not the only type 
of claims that could be brought in connection with a dispute 
concerning the application of an investment treaty.233 In fact, a State 
could seek purely declaratory relief, acknowledging that the other 
party has violated the agreement. This does not mean, however, that 
there is a clear-cut distinction between diplomatic protection and 
declaratory relief claims; when a State requests adjudication on 
alleged violations of the rights of its nationals committed by the other 
contracting party, the assessment and determination of whether the 
latter has breached its obligations under the treaty is an inevitable task 
to be performed.234 For this reason, and since to our knowledge there 
is as yet no clear case law on claims for declaratory relief, our 
discussion will focus on the more crucial distinction between 
diplomatic protection and interpretive claims.235 
With regard to both types of claims, it appears that despite being 
frequently provided for in modern-day BITs and FTAs, State-to-State 
arbitration has actually been used as a dispute resolution mechanism 
only in three cases: Italy v. Cuba236 (a diplomatic protection claim 
                                                                                                                                     
232. See Roberts, supra note 38, at 3. 
233. See Lourie, supra note 228, at 514. 
234. Id. 
235. In her discussion of declaratory relief claims, NATHALIE BERNASCONI-
OSTERWALDER, supra note 227, at 15 (citing, among other cases, Mexico v. United States (in 
the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services), NAFTA Chapter 20 State-to-State Arbitration, 
Final Report of the Panel, February 6, 2001, paras. 15-24). 
236. See Republic of Italy v. Republic of Cuba, Ad hoc Arbitration, Interim Award, 15 
March 2005; see also Republic of Italy v. Republic of Cuba, Ad hoc Arbitration, Final Award, 
15 January 2008; see also Michele Potestà, Interstate Arbitration––Bilateral Investment 
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concerning the application of the treaty), Peru v. Chile,237 and 
Ecuador v. United States238 (interpretive claims). Notwithstanding the 
small number of cases, it cannot be denied that the existence of these 
relatively recent disputes, as well as the current practice of States 
regarding investment dispute resolution systems provided for in BITs 
and FTAs, signals a trend towards a revaluation and re-emergence of 
State-to-State arbitration, given the concerns raised by investor-State 
arbitration. Indeed, some States have recently decided not to include 
an investor-State clause, opting instead for a State-to-State remedy.239 
Turning now to an analysis of the European context and EU law, 
it is important to recall that no case concerning the agreements 
concluded by individual Member States with third countries has yet 
been decided under State-to-State dispute settlement provisions.240 As 
for FTAs, containing investment chapters, that were negotiated so far, 
but not yet in force pending finalization of the text by the 
Commission, final approval by the Parliament and Council and/or 
completion of ratification procedures by Member States (such as, 
inter alia, CETA 2016,241 FTA with Singapore,242 and FTA with 
Vietnam243), it is possible to infer that they all contain a chapter on 
State-to-State arbitration, which is applicable also to investment 
disputes. In most agreements, indeed, it is specified that an investor of 
a contracting party may submit his claim against the host State 
“[w]ithout prejudice to the rights and obligations of the Parties” under 
the chapter on Dispute Settlement.244 In light of this, it seems quite 
probable that other agreements under negotiation will provide for a 
                                                                                                                                     
Treaties––Diplomatic Protection––Exhaustion of Local Remedies––Definition of Investment, 
106 AM. J. INT’L L 341 (2012); Giorgio Sacerdoti, & Matilde Recanati, Approaches to 
Investment Protection Outside of Specific International Investment Agreements and Investor-
State Settlement, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1839-62 (Marc Bungenberg, Jörn 
Griebel, Stephan Hobe, & August Reinisch eds., 2015). 
237. See Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Luchetti Peru, S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/4, (Feb. 7, 2005). 
238. See Republic of Ecuador v. U.S., PCA Case No. 2012-5 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012). See 
in particular, Jarrod Wong, The Subversion of State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration, 53 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 6, 10-14, 27-30 (2014). 
239. See, e.g., Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines for an 
Economic Partnership Agreement (2006) and Malaysia-Australia Free Trade Agreement 
(2012); see also BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER, supra note 227, at 1. 
240. See Is Investor-State Dispute Settlement, supra note 74, at 660. 
241. See CETA, supra note 3, Ch. 29. 
242. See EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 69, at Chapter 15. 
243. See EU-Viet. FTA, supra note 3, at “Dispute Settlement.” 
244. See CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.18. 
1140 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1081 
similar mechanism. Therefore, in line with the rule of customary 
international law245 that a direct claim of an individual may co-exist 
with the right of his home State to espouse a claim, the EU has chosen 
not to regard the inclusion of an investor-State system of dispute 
settlement in FTAs as a means to rule out inter-State arbitration. This 
is certainly a reasonable choice, since a hybrid system that includes 
both remedies seems to be the best solution to reach a fair balance 
between the interests of the State and the investors, one which has the 
advantage of responding to the concerns that (more or less recently) 
have been raised in relation to investor-State arbitration. 
There are several reasons why State-to-State arbitration – 
foreseen in addition to investor-State remedies – may offer a useful 
remedy for settling certain disagreements between the EU and its 
trade partners and/or, in general, for clarifying certain treaty 
provisions. With regard to claims brought in the context of diplomatic 
protection, it might be an appealing option for investors when they 
fear discrimination or retaliation by a host State if they initiate 
investor-State arbitration proceedings. In addition, small investors 
who wish to avoid the expenses of bringing a direct claim against the 
host State may prefer that their case be brought by their home State. 
This holds true especially when injuries concern numerous investors 
and could lead to class actions.246 
A State-to-State dispute resolution system seems even more 
attractive for the EU, its Member States, third-country partners, and 
investors when we consider it from the view of interpretive claims. In 
this case, since what is at stake is the adjudication of a dispute 
between an investor and a host State on treaty provisions that are not 
directly connected with the application of substantive standards, the 
rationale for the inclusion of State-to-State arbitration rests on a 
number of observations. Rather than having a variety of rulings by 
different tribunals on specific investment disputes, the mechanism of 
State-to-State interpretive claims would ensure interpretive authority 
and thus make it possible to resolve uncertainties as to the meaning, 
scope, and extent of the rights and obligations of States towards one 
other and investors. These claims could be used by the EU institutions 
and/or EU Member States and treaty partners to shed light on the 
                                                                                                                                     
245. As stated in the Commentary to Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s 
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, “the customary international law rules on diplomatic 
protection and the rules governing the protection of human rights are complementary.” 
246. See Roberts, supra note 38, at 14-15. 
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content and limits of one or more provisions, especially where 
interpretation may potentially have an impact on numerous investors 
in the host State. In this perspective, State-to-State arbitration could 
help reduce the proliferation of far-fetched claims that have a limited 
chance of success. From the point of view of the host State, it could 
serve as a tool for determining whether a certain measure is 
compatible with the treaty: a single ruling would be a much better 
solution than facing multiple investment claims. Moreover, on 
interpretive claims, the EU and its partners should make clear in the 
agreements that the concept of “dispute” as a prerequisite for 
initiating State-to-State arbitration proceedings is to be understood in 
a broad sense, that is, as comprising both disagreement between the 
parties and silence or failure to respond to a request for a joint 
interpretation.247 This seems necessary especially in light of recent 
case law, namely the Ecuador v. United States248 ruling, in which the 
tribunal observed that there was no “dispute” because there was no 
“positive opposition” by a party against another on the interpretation 
of the treaty.249 
Regarding the more operational yet crucial issue of how best to 
ensure an effective coordination between investor-State arbitration 
and State-to-State arbitration250 in EU free trade and investment 
                                                                                                                                     
247. See also Clovis J. Trevino, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration and the 
Interplay with Investor–State Arbitration Under the Same Treaty, 5 J. INT’L DISP. 
SETTLEMENT, 2014, 199, 202-04. On the ambiguous meaning of “dispute,” see Christoph 
Schreuer, What is a Legal Dispute?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND 
FRAGMENTATION: FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF GERHARD HAFNER 959-60 (Isabelle Buffard, 
James Crawford, Alain Pellet, & Stephan Wittich eds., 2008). 
248. See Republic of Ecuador v. United States of America (PCA Case No. 2012-5), 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/1494#sthash.R0ecUZCV.dpuf. 
249. See Jarrod Hepburn & Luke Eric Peterson, US-Ecuador Inter-State Investment 
Treaty Award Released to Parties; Tribunal Members Part Ways on Key Issues, INV. ARB. 
REP. (Oct. 30, 2012), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/us-ecuador-inter-state-investment-
treaty-award-released-to-parties-tribunal-members-part-ways-on-key-issues/. 
250. On such relationship, see Michele Potestà, State-to-State Dispute Settlement 
Pursuant to Bilateral Investment Treaties: Is There Potential?, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 761-65 (Nerina Boschiero, Tullio 
Scovazzi, Cesare Pitea, & Chiara Ragni eds., 2013); Michele Potestà, Towards a Greater Role 
for State-to-State Arbitration in the Architecture of Investment Treaties?, in THE ROLE OF THE 
STATE IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 264-71 (Shaheeza Lalani & Rodrigo Polanco Lazo 
eds. 2015) [hereinafter Towards a Greater Role For State-to-State Arbitration]; Ben 
Juratowitch, supra note 38, at 22-35 (2008); Chang-fa Lo, Relations and Possible Interactions 
between State-State Dispute Settlement and Investor-State Arbitration Under Bits, 6 
CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 1, 10-26 (2013); Greg Lourie, supra note 228; BERNASCONI-
OSTERWALDER, supra note 227; Roberts, supra note 38; Trevino, supra note 247. 
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agreements,251 it should be noted that there are neither precise rules 
under customary law nor general investment treaties that give a clear 
indication of how the two mechanisms interrelate.252 Clear solutions 
are even less feasible when innovative, permanent investor-State 
dispute settlement systems are at stake. As anticipated above, the 
analysis will be focused, in particular, on investor-State arbitration in 
their interplay with State-to-State arbitration. 
Most BITs do not contain any provision on the interplay between 
State-to-State arbitration and investor-State arbitration and are silent 
as to whether the latter should be prioritized over the former.253 
Moreover, it is important to point out that the rule of exhaustion of 
local remedies, defined by the International Court of Justice as a 
“well-established rule of customary international law,”254 applies 
within the framework of inter-State arbitration only in the case of a 
diplomatic protection claim.255 Indeed, the rule does not have the 
status of customary law with respect to other inter-State claims.256 
Although we cannot speak of a potential conflict between State-
to-State arbitration and investor-State arbitration, or of competing 
jurisdiction in the strict sense (the “disputes” are not the same; they 
are between different parties, have different objects, and are based on 
different legal grounds), the lack of clear rules on their interaction 
may entail a number of tensions between parallel or subsequent 
proceedings and lead to inconsistency due to conflicting decisions. In 
order to avoid such tensions, it is our belief that EU FTAs should 
contain rules to govern the proceedings. 
                                                                                                                                     
251. Although outside the scope of this article, an interesting issue is that of recourse to 
WTO law as a new form of diplomatic protection in parallel with investment arbitration. See 
Titi, supra note 32, at 265-87. 
252. See Lo, supra note 250, at 4. But see Article 13.12 of the China-New Zealand BIT, 
Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nov. 22 1988, 1787 UNTS 
186. 
253. Contra Wong, supra note 238, at 13-14, 33-48. 
254. Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America), Judgment of March 21, 
1959, ICJ Rep 6, at 25. 
255. As demonstrated by the award rendered by the Tribunal in Republic of It. v. 
Republic of Cuba, Sentence Préliminaire, [Interim Award] (Ad Hoc Arb. Trib. Mar. 15, 2005) 
(Fr.); Republic of It. v. Republic of Cuba, Sentence finale [Final Award ] (Ad Hoc Arb. Trib. 
Jan. 15, 2008) (Fr.). 
256. See also Potestà, State-to-State Dispute Settlement Pursuant to Bilateral Investment 
Treaties: Is There Potential?, supra note 250, at 252-53, 259-64. 
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In order to address the matter of coordination,257 the timing of 
the inter-State remedial channel vis-à-vis the investor-State 
proceedings should be taken into account.258 In its turn, this factor 
must be considered in relation to another crucial element: the nature 
of the claim as diplomatic protection or interpretive.259 
With regard to diplomatic protection claims, it is our opinion 
that agreements should include a provision modeled on Article 
27(1)260 of the ICSID Convention,261 which reads: 
No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an 
international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its 
nationals and another Contracting State shall have consented to 
submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this 
Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have failed 
to abide by and comply with the award rendered in such 
dispute.262 
Put differently, this means that if an investor has consented to 
submit or has already submitted a dispute by using the investor-State 
mechanism, the investor’s home State may not initiate a State-to-State 
diplomatic protection claim unless the host State fails to abide by the 
arbitral award. Thus, this provision would protect the host State from 
the risk of multiple simultaneous claims. As for cases where the 
investor-State award has already been rendered, the provision should 
specify that the investor’s home State may not institute State-to-State 
                                                                                                                                     
257. On the relevance of the good faith principle, see Lo, supra note 250. 
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see also Roberts, supra note 38, at 66-68 (analyzing claims for declaratory relief); Lourie, 
supra note 228, at 515. 
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supra note 238, at 30-35. 
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provision similar to Article 27, that would lead to considerable uncertainty. This is why the 
best solution seems to be the insertion of a norm that regulates the matter. As foreseen in 
CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.23, ¶ 2: “A claim may be submitted under the following rules: the 
ICSID Convention; the ICSID Additional Facility Rules where the conditions for proceedings 
pursuant to paragraph (a) do not apply; the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; or any other 
arbitration rules on agreement of the disputing parties.” 
262. This model has been adopted in some BITs, such as the Agreement between the UK 
and Mexico for the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments, signed on May 12, 
2006. 
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proceedings for the purpose of exercising diplomatic protection 
except, once again, where the respondent State fails to abide by the 
arbitral award. On the other hand, where the investor has neither 
submitted nor consented to submit a dispute, the diplomatic protection 
claim may be pursued even in the absence of specific provisions on its 
interplay with investor-State arbitration. Indeed, as observed by Ben 
Juratowitch, “exhaustion of international, as opposed to domestic, 
remedies is certainly not a prerequisite to diplomatic protection.”263 
With regard to interpretive claims, EU free trade and investment 
agreements should include a provision clarifying: (1) whether, and to 
what extent, parallel or subsequent proceedings (investor-State and 
State-to-State) could be undertaken, and (2) the legal effect of a 
tribunal’s award on the other tribunal. The first situation is where a 
party initiates inter-State arbitration proceedings, the tribunal renders 
the award, and then an investor-State tribunal is called upon to rely on 
the same provision under examination by the inter-State tribunal, thus 
interpreting it, in order to assess whether there has been a violation of 
the treaty. In this case, the investor-State tribunal will have to read the 
award for purposes of treaty interpretation, thus recognizing its 
binding character. This means that the award is to be considered 
binding on treaty parties, investors, and future State-to-State and 
investor-State tribunals. Therefore, its legal effect is very similar to 
that of a joint interpretive agreement between the treaty parties. As 
noted by the International Court of Justice, “an agreement as to the 
interpretation of a provision reached after the conclusion of the treaty 
represents an authentic interpretation by the parties which must be 
read into the treaty for purposes of its interpretation.”264 Therefore, 
EU FTAs may contain a clause under which a decision on the 
interpretation of treaty provisions delivered by a State-to-State arbitral 
tribunal must be binding not only on the contracting parties to the 
treaty, but also on investor-State tribunals if these are called upon to 
adjudicate a dispute requiring an interpretation of the same treaty 
provisions.265 Such a clause would ensure greater certainty and 
                                                                                                                                     
263. Juratowitch, supra note 38, at 35. 
264. Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), Judgment, 1999, 
I.C.J. 1045, at 1075 (Dec. 1999); see also Roberts, supra note 38, at 60-61. 
265. Of course, the legal effect of an interpretive award will depend on the text of the 
relevant free trade and investment treaty. Anthea Roberts speaks of highly persuasive effects. 
See Roberts, supra note 38, at 59-63. 
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consistency by creating a binding erga omnes effect and acting as a 
legal precedent. 
The second situation is where a party files a purely interpretive 
claim and, before an award is rendered, an investor files an 
investment claim whose resolution requires an interpretation of the 
same treaty provision. EU FTAs should contain a provision stating 
that the investor-State tribunal has to stay proceedings and await the 
interpretation to be rendered by the inter-State tribunal. As a 
consequence, the investor-State tribunal should give primacy to a 
State-to-State tribunal entrusted with the authority to resolve disputes 
about the interpretation of the treaty. In the case of an inter-State 
claim filed after the commencement of investor-State proceedings, 
but before the deliverance of the award, the agreements should 
request that the tribunal order a stay of proceedings. Of course, no 
problems would arise in the case of a State-to-State claim filed by a 
contracting party dissatisfied with the interpretation given by the 
investor-State tribunal in its award. As confirmed in most agreements, 
the award rendered by the investor-State tribunal is binding and 
becomes res judicata. It is essential that agreements are designed in 
such a way as to prevent the risk that State-to-State arbitration may be 
used to call into question the finality of awards and the duty of the 
host State to implement them, or that it may be employed to litigate 
issues for a second time, generating an additional burden in terms of 
time and money. 
All of the above must be distinguished from the question of 
participation as amicus curiae of the non-disputing Treaty State party 
in investor-State proceedings.266 Just as there should be no room for 
the investor’s home State exercising diplomatic protection, home 
State submissions on questions of treaty interpretation should be 
foreseen in EU FTAs, representing an important contribution to a 
better decision-making process.267 The provision contained in CETA 
2016 is welcomed and should be replicated in other agreements, 
                                                                                                                                     
266. For an insightful analysis (including some observations on the possible intervention 
of non-disputing State party not merely as amicus curiae), see Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, 
Non-Disputing State Submissions in Investment Arbitration: Resurgence of Diplomatic 
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(Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Marcelo Kohen, & Jorge E. Viñuales, eds., 2012). 
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(2003), Art. 15.19(2). 
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whether the investor-State system of dispute settlement will imply 
arbitration mechanisms or be modeled on ICS. Article 8.38 of the 
CETA reads as follows: 
The Tribunal shall accept or, after consultation with the disputing 
parties, may invite, oral or written submissions from the non-
disputing Party regarding the interpretation of the Agreement. 
The non-disputing Party may attend a hearing held under this 
Section. […] The Tribunal shall ensure that the disputing parties 
are given a reasonable opportunity to present their observations 
on a submission by the non-disputing Party to the Agreement.268 
Finally, our observations on the inclusion of State-to-State 
arbitration in EU FTAs, as well as on their coordination, should also 
be read in light of Section II of this article, which discusses the 
clashes between external systems of dispute resolution and the CJEU. 
In other words, inter-State arbitration could represent a successful 
remedy for settling disputes and/or interpreting provisions of the 
agreements in question provided that the principle of autonomy of the 
EU, namely of the CJEU, is respected. Mechanisms apt at securing 
the respect of such principle, like a system of prior involvement of 
EU institutions, are even more important when confronted with State-
to-State arbitration; suffice to take into account the Mox Plant ruling, 
mentioned above, as well as the opinions rendered by the CJEU on 
external inter-State remedies envisaged in the agreements concluded 
by the EU. In particular, the respect of the autonomy of EU legal 
order becomes essential in the context of State-to-State interpretive 
claims in which tribunals, rather than adjudicating single disputes and 
assessing whether compensation must be awarded, are empowered to 
exercise purely interpretive functions in relation to a free trade and 
investment treaty, functions which may frequently require – even 
more than those performed by investment tribunals adjudicating a 
specific dispute – an interpretation of EU law.269 
B. From Arbitral Tribunals toward Transformative Adjudication 
In CETA 2016 and EU-Vietnam FTA the EU, along with the 
third countries concerned, has reaffirmed the same commitment 
expressed in TTIP toward a system of permanent investment 
                                                                                                                                     
268. CETA, supra note 3, arts. 8.38(2) and (4). 
269. For our extensive discussion, see supra Section II.B. 
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tribunals.270 The qualifications, approximate salaries, and ethical rules 
that apply to judges are spelled out in the EU position for the TTIP 
negotiation and clearly influences the EU-Vietnam FTA and CETA 
2016. In these two important agreements271 the judicial architecture 
varies in terms of structure even though there is a similar underlying 
rationale, namely to redress some of the fundamental flaws of the 
investment arbitration systems expressed by lawyers and civil society 
alike with respect to the four pillars of public law adjudication: 
accountability, coherence, independence and openness.272 As Cecilia 
Malmström said proudly after the adoption of CETA in 2016, “[b]y 
making the system work like an international court, these changes 
will ensure that citizens can trust it to deliver fair and objective 
judgments.”273 This statement has a twofold function: for the 
Commission to influence its US counterparts and even more 
ambitiously transform CETA 2016 and EU-Vietnam tribunal into a 
multilateral investment court that will eventually eliminate the 
tribunals. 
Some lawyers and scholars alike have already expressed their 
skepticism toward these investment tribunals because of the 
overstated benefits of greater coherence and effectiveness in 
protecting investors through an appeal mechanisms as well as the 
belief that judges are per se more independent and objective than 
arbitrators in their legal reasoning.274 It remains undisputed that the 
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THE GLOBE AND MAIL, (Feb. 29, 2016, 9:53AM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
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274. See Barrie McKenna, Canada, EU Revise Trade Deal, Add Investor-State Dispute 
Tribunal, GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 29, 2016, 9:53 AM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-
on-business/industry-news/the-law-page/ottawa-says-legal-review-of-canada-eu-free-trade-
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ambitious judicial architecture put forward by the EU in both CETA 
2016 and its Vietnam FTA for investment tribunals has deep 
transformative ambitions. From an institutional perspective a future 
multilateral investment court aims to replace the various investment 
tribunals envisaged for every FTA.275 In substance it remains to be 
seen whether this new adjudication system transforms the practice 
and the outcomes of international investment law in a more 
democratic and egalitarian direction.276 In light of this transformative 
ideal, the underlying political economy of the international 
investment treaty regime shows not only the benefits in protecting 
foreign investors but also how the costs of pollution and labor 
violations are easily shifted from the investors to the local 
communities of the host State. 
However, this transformative adjudication model proposal is not 
merely utopian. Take for instance the letter from Berndt Lange, the 
MEP chairing the International Trade Committee in the European 
Parliament to Malmstrom in 2015. Welcoming the TTIP proposal on 
the Investment Court System Lange reiterates that sustainable 
development and corporate social responsibility provisions should be 
mainstreamed throughout the investment chapter.277 
Along the same line, many environmental and sustainability 
advocates have long asked for more transparency in large investments 
in land for forestry, agriculture, or extractive projects that are often 
agreed to in secrecy, eliminating the voice of the affected 
communities. These advocates have asked for greater transparency, 
participation and disclosure to the affected communities in the 
processes before the government is about to grant the concession to 
the foreign investors.278 Not surprisingly, many of these cases have 
not found avenues for redress before domestic courts for many 
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reasons, including the fact that foreign investors often represent a 
source of wealth for the host governments. 
Local communities, however, have brought some of these cases 
against the States that negotiated without respecting indigenous or 
communal property rights before international human rights courts.279 
For instance, before the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACHR) petitioners used the right of information and 
transparency in the decision of the Haitian government to attract 
tourism and the mining industry to Haiti, communities sought redress 
for human rights violations by the extractive industries in Latin 
America on both peasants and indigenous communities whose health 
conditions have deteriorated due to the pollution created by the 
foreign investors to the air, water, and environment.280 
While foreign investors have access to international investment 
courts against the host State when it is in violation of environmental, 
human rights, labor, or corporate social responsibility norms affecting 
local communities, indigenous people and workers have limited 
remedies against these tortious actions by foreign investors. Despite 
the exceptional case of the US, in which federal courts have redressed 
these violations through the Alien Tort Statute, this avenue has been 
severely precluded by the recent Kiobel jurisprudence of the US 
Supreme Court.281 
In his utopian proposal, Lance Compa argues that TPP 
represents a possibility to create a truly transformative adjudication 
mechanism to enforce labor, environmental and consumer protection 
standards in international trade and investment agreements.282 Compa 
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envisages a more egalitarian system of redress for human right, labor 
and environmental violations: 
Consider instead creating an innovative alternative system to 
enforce trade agreements’ labor, environmental, and consumer-
protection provisions. Let the same door open to investors 
wronged by governments swing open for workers and 
communities harmed by investors. Give civil-society forces the 
power to bring multinational corporations before a neutral 
arbitral panel to seek damages for violations of labor rights, 
environmental standards, consumer protections, and human rights 
that relevant chapters of the trade agreement purport to guarantee 
and protect.283 
Clearly, Compa goes further than the European Parliament not 
only by mainstreaming environmental sustainability and corporate 
social responsibility norms but also by creating more equal access to 
international adjudication for investors as well as workers and local 
communities. As he puts it “Addressing inequality without fear of 
investors’ challenges” 284 should be one of the priorities of a 
transformative investment regime in countries where rising 
inequalities triggered by NAFTA in the US and by the increasing 
income disparities among European economies. Compa’s proposal is 
that investment arbitration should not interfere with some 
governmental measures such as setting national minimum wages, 
guaranteeing the “prevailing wage” in publicly funded project and 
setting health and safety standards higher than national ones.285 
In taking an economic development perspective, Roberto 
Echandi has warned against the escalation of costly litigation in 
international investment arbitration. Rather than on courts, Echandi 
focuses on alternative dispute resolution policies and mechanisms that 
could provide less litigious remedies without going to court.286 A 
well-known challenge to the system of investment treaty arbitration is 
that several developing countries like Argentina and Ecuador have 
denounced and abandoned the ICSID system in the attempt to create a 
new regional model within Mercosur. As a result, the engagement 
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between arbitration and law and development scholars led to 
questioning and further reassessing the outcomes of investment 
arbitration in terms of greater procedural fairness287 or in creating new 
adjudication models in South-South relations.288 
CONCLUSION 
EU trade negotiators have changed the international architecture 
for the protection of foreign investors through by moving away from 
a traditional ISDS model and adopting instead a permanent court 
system with procedural due process guarantees: the ICS. The open 
question remains, however, whether beyond such procedural 
innovation also substantive aspirations lie behind the agenda of EU 
trade negotiators to promote a truly transformative trade and 
investment regime in their recently negotiated FTAs,289 rather than 
simply responding to external and internal political and legal 
pressures. These include the clashes between EU law and 
international arbitration as well as the need to safeguard the principle 
of autonomy of the EU legal order as interpreted by the CJEU’s 
jurisprudence. The new agreements of CETA 2016 and the EU-
Vietnam FTA with the creation of permanent investment tribunals 
and appellate mechanisms demonstrate that EU negotiators have put 
forward a consistent transformative approach toward international 
trade and investment regimes that can reinforce their negotiating 
positions vis à vis the U.S. in TTIP, on which the USTR remains 
lukewarm on the ICS.290 
While welcoming the ICS as a procedural departure from the 
traditional ISDS regime, in this article we suggest a new role for the 
underemphasized State-to-State arbitration and we suggest 
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strengthening the substance of the investment clauses in the new 
FTAs. While the transformative procedural architecture of the ICS is 
well established we question whether its substantive clauses on the 
right to regulate and fair and equitable treatment are well-equipped to 
engage with emerging questions of corporate social responsibility, 
sustainable development and human rights arising in international 
investment disputes. 
 
 
